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PART ONE
1.0 Introduction
1.1 Background to the Research
The number of international migrants passed 200 million in 2008, more than double the figure in 1965. As the
number of migrants continues to grow, the character of international migration has been transformed. South-South
migration, as it is now commonly referred to, is acquiring ever-greater significance in contemporary migration
configurations. South-South movements of international migrants are highly gendered. In particular, the
feminization of international migration has meant that the absolute numbers and proportion of women migrants is
increasingly rapidly. More and more women are also migrating for work in other countries in their own right. The
gender dynamics behind this new trend in South-South migration have not been sufficiently examined. In spite of
the rapid increase in the volume and diversity of knowledge on the migration-development nexus, issues on gender
and especially the changing role of women, continue to be lacking.

This study aims to contribute to the narrowing of this knowledge gap through an interlinked analysis of migration
and development from a gendered perspective. It pays particular attention to the impact of remittances – financial,
in-kind and social – on gendered development processes in countries of origin and amongst transnational households
spanning the origin and destination countries. The study focuses on these dynamics in the context of Lesotho and
the destination country of South Africa.

1.2 Objectives

The overall objective of the Project is to enhance gender-responsive local development by identifying and
promoting options in the utilization of remittances for sustainable livelihoods and the building of social
capital in poor rural and semi-urban communities. The strategic aims include:
•

increasing awareness and improving access by women-headed, remittance-recipient households to
productive resources while augmenting their assets and strengthening their capacities;

•

providing relevant information and support to local and national governments to identify and
formulate policies that will optimize the utilization of remittances for sustainable livelihoods and
building social capital; and

•

enhancing the capacities of key stakeholders to integrate gender into policies, programmes,
projects and other initiatives linking remittances with sustainable livelihoods and building social
4

capital.
The Project has been implemented in six countries, which provide a global representation of UNDP’s
regional bureaus: Albania, Dominican Republic, Lesotho, Morocco, Phillipines and Senegal.
The Project’s main hypothesis is that the optimized use of remittances enhances gender-responsive local
development. By analyzing the actual use of remittances, opportunities and weaknesses will be diagnosed,
thus identifying possibilities for intervention as well as identifying capacity building needs for enhancing
gender-responsive local development. The developmental impacts of remittances can be analyzed at the
macro, meso and micro levels.

1.3 Methodology

The research methodology used for the Lesotho case study involved several components:

Desktop Review
A review was undertaken to map local gender and migration issues within their national and regional
contexts, and to identify specific options for interventions, through an in-depth analysis of existing data
and information at the macro and meso level. The review provided the broad frame of reference for the
analysis and interpretation of new data obtained at the micro level. A mapping exercise of key
stakeholders involved in local development, gender and migration issues was included.

Quantitative Data
A nationally-representative household survey of migrant-sending households was conducted in Lesotho by
SAMP in 2005. The survey collected data on the household composition and remittance practices of
1,023 Basotho households and 1,076 migrants, of whom 899 were male and 177 were female. The data
set from the survey was analyzed for this Project using a gender lens.

Qualitative Data
In-depth case-study research was conducted in Lesotho in December 2008 and January 2009. All
5

interviews were conducted in Lesotho. Two villages in different parts of the Lesotho lowlands were
chosen for the study: Ha Mafefooane and ‘Mahuu. Ha Mafefooane is in the Roma Valley near the small
university town of Roma. ‘Mahuu is a more remote rural village. Both villages send male and female
migrant workers to South Africa. The sample was stratified to ensure that the target number of
respondents was obtained in each of six categories as follows:
Table 1: Location of Interviews
Female Remitters
Male Remitters
Female Remittance Receivers
Male Remittance Receivers
Female Entrepreneurs
Male Entrepreneurs

Ha Mafefooane
5
5
4
3
5
5

‘Mahuu
5
5
5
4
4
2

Total
10
10
9
7
9
7

Five focus groups were conducted (two with migrants, two with remittance receivers and one with
remittance-based entrepreneurs). All interviews were transcribed and translated into English for analysis.
Interviews were also conducted in South Africa and Lesotho with a selection of stakeholders and key
informants.

2.0 Migration between Lesotho and South Africa
2.1 Background Information on Lesotho
Lesotho is one of the most-migration dependent countries in the world. Of a population of around two
million people, over 240,000 were estimated to be outside the country in 2008 (World Bank 2008).
Migrant remittances are the country’s major source of foreign exchange, accounting for 25% of GDP in
2006. Lesotho is also one of the poorer countries in the world with high domestic unemployment,
declining agricultural production, falling life expectancy, rising child mortality and half the population
living below the poverty line. In the 2007-8 UN Human Development Index, Lesotho ranked 138th out of
The majority of households and rural communities are dependent on remittances for their livelihood.
Households without access to migrant remittances are significantly worse off than those that do have such
access. According to the 2006 Lesotho National Human Development Report, “Migrant labourers’
remittances have played a critical role in providing household incomes over a long period of time.”
6

2.2 A Gendered History of Migration from Lesotho to South Africa
The long history of migration from Lesotho to South Africa is described as follows by Turner (2004: 9):
For generations, Basotho livelihood aspirations have focused on wage employment. For most of
this time, the country’s role as a regional labour reserve meant that most of this wage employment
was across the border in South Africa. To have at least one wage earner in the family is seen as the
foundation of livelihood security, both through current wage income and through future activities.
These future activities (notably farming) can be built from the assets that wages may buy, and may
continue long after wage earning has ceased. Poverty threatens households that are unable to break
into wage employment, or that lose such employment permanently.
Migration from Lesotho was dominated by males. From the 1870s onwards, the young men of the Basotho
household migrated to the South African mines and remitted their earnings home to buy guns (in the 19th
century), pay colonial taxes and, as the country became more impoverished, to meet household livelihoods
needs. The South African mining industry employed only male migrants and the British and South African
governments barred women and children from accompanying migrant miners to the place of work.
Colonial officials, chiefs and household patriarchs also tried to prevent female spouses and young women
from leaving the country by imposing sanctions and through threats of violent punishment.

Female migrants did still cross the border to work, resisting these controls on their personal mobility
(Bonner 1990; Maloka 1997; Coplan 2001a). They were usually from households without a male migrant
and comprised young women or widows escaping poverty at home (Bonner 1990; Maloka 1997). The
decision to migrate was often taken out of desperation: “despite the degrading conditions, social isolation
and risk of arrest … women go because they have no alternative” (Murray 1981: 154; see also Gay 1980a,
1980b). Migration was often an act of rebellion against patriarchal control, as the historian of gender
relations in colonial Lesotho, Marc Epprecht (2000: 82), has written:

Such acts of rebellion came with serious risks and it is important to draw attention to the courage of
the women who made them. Historians have rightfully emphasized the courage of male migrants
who tramped hundreds of kilometers in harsh weather to face brutal overseers, dangerous working
conditions, and murderous tsotsis (bandits). Women’s migration is all the more remarkable in that
they often faced equally or more dangerous and exploitative conditions. Life on the farms of the
Orange Free State, for example, included near-starvation rations, squalid quarters, polluted water,
and outright robbery by employers. Even when paid, and even when they performed exactly the
7

same tasks as men, women invariably earned less than men. Long days, squalor and police
harassment were likely even more common features of life in the urban centres. Away from their
families and husbands, women were also exposed to forms of men’s sexual violence which had
been rare in the village context – rape above all. The brutality of husbands and fathers who caught
runaway women could be even more horrific.
In their efforts to restrict and control the mobility of women, the colonial government passed the
Basutoland Native Women’s Restriction Proclamation which aimed to “prohibit native women from
leaving … against the will of the husbands, fathers or natural guardians.” Women now supposed to get the
permission of the family patriarch and village chief in order to go to South Africa. Yet, such patriarchal
controls were never completely successful as women continued to migrate. In apartheid South Africa,
Basotho women were highly marginalized in the labour market, confined to domestic service or to
farmwork or to illegal informal sector activity including brewing and sex work.

The policy of the British colonial government in Lesotho and the apartheid government in South Africa
was that men should migrate without their dependents and women should remain in Lesotho, work in the
rural agricultural sector and feed themselves and their families. The notorious male migrant labour system
to the South African mines had a major impact on household gender relations in Lesotho, disempowering
most women and forcing them to be completely dependent on male migrants for their livelihood (Gay
1980a, 1980b; Gordon 1981; Bonner 1990). Women were extremely vulnerable to poverty as they were
dependent on what male household members decided to remit to them and how often. Women had no
independent access to land, could not open bank accounts on their own and had few rights in a highly
patriarchal society. The migration of married men was particularly hard on women in Lesotho and rates of
abandonment, separation and divorce became high. In addition, the working conditions on the gold mines
were so dangerous as to produce many “gold widows” as they were known. “Gold widows” and
“abandoned” women had few independent livelihood opportunities within Lesotho and were generally
marginalized and sunk to the poorest strata of Basotho society.

2.3 Existing Gender Characteristics of Migration Process
Since the collapse of apartheid in South Africa, the nature of migration between Lesotho and South Africa
has changed dramatically, a process that has had considerable gender implications. These changes were
summarized from a gender perspective in the 2004 Lesotho Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as
8

follows:
Historically the labour market has been very distorted from a gender perspective, with migrant
labour to the mines being the exclusive domain of men. After the advent of democracy in South
Africa in 1994 this started to change; by 2001 one fifth of those Basotho working in South Africa
were women. Within the country a new distortion is emerging with the rapidly growing textile
industries employing virtually only women. Poorly educated men now find themselves standing
before two doors that are effectively shut: mine recruitment has virtually ended, and the txtile
manufacturing sector has no room for them (Lesotho Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2005).
The “feminization” of migration from Lesotho involves (a) an increase in the absolute number of female
migrants, (b) an increase in the proportion of migrants who are female and (c) a qualitative change in the
character of female migration. Although still low relative to men, the SAMP survey showed that 16.4% of
the total number of migrants are now female, a higher proportion of the total than in either Swaziland or
Mozambique, the two migration-sending countries with which Lesotho is often compared (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Sex of Migrants
Country

Male

Lesotho
83.6
Mozambique
93.6
Swaziland
92.4
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Female
16.4
6.2
7.6

The recent nature of female migration from Lesotho is confirmed by the fact that nearly 60% of female
migrants in the SAMP household survey had less than five years migratory experience (compared with
29% of men) (Table 3.2). Over 80% of women have been migrating for ten years or less. On the other
hand, a quarter of male migrants have over 20 years migration experience (compared to only 6.8% of
female migrants).

Table 3.2: Length of Migratory Experience
Age
1-5 years
6-10 years

Male (%)
29.1
16.3

Female (%)
59.4
23.4
9

11-15 years
15.0
16-20 years
13.6
21-25 years
10.5
26-30 years
9.5
31 or more years
5.8
Don’t know
0.1
Total
99.9
Source: SAMP Household Survey

6.3
3.4
3.4
2.3
1.1
0.6
99.9

The survey also showed major gender differences in the marital status of migrants and in their relationship
to the head of household. The typical male migrant is over 40 years of age, married and a household head.
Eighty four percent of male migrants are married and 78% are household heads (Table 3.4).

In contrast, the female migratory stream is much more diverse. There are three main groups of migrants.
First, there are younger unmarried or married members of male-headed households; either daughters,
daughters-in-law or nieces (51% of all migrants). A second group of female migrants are spouses of male
household heads who no longer work because of unemployment, disease (especially TB and HIV/AIDS) or
disability (18% of all female migrants). The third group of female migrants are older women who are
divorced/separated, abandoned or widowed (48% of female migrants). Some live in extended families but
around half are heads of their own household.

Table 3.3: Marital Status of Migrants
Marital Status
Males (%)
Unmarried
9.7
Married
84.2
Cohabiting
0.3
Divorced
0
Separated
1.7
Abandoned
0.2
Widowed
3.9
Total
100
N
934
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Females (%)
25.0
26.5
0.5
4.6
15.3
3.6
24.5
100
196

10

Table 3.4: Relationship of Migrants to Household Head
Relation
Head
Spouse/partner
Son/daughter
Father/mother
Brother/sister
Grandchild
Grandparent
Son/daughter-in-law
Nephew/niece
Other relative
Non-relative
Total
N
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Males (%)
76.5
0.1
21.8
0.0
0.5
0.4
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.6
0.0
100
934

Females (%)
24.0
18.4
45.4
1.0
1.5
1.5
0.0
5.1
0.5
2.6
0.0
100
196

The SAMP survey therefore identified four main types of migrant-sending household all with different
gender configurations and roles:
•

Male-headed households in which the patriarch is also the primary migrant. The vast majority of
these migrants have jobs in the South African mining industry and their spouses/partners remain in
Lesotho to take care of the household and raise children. If they can find work, young men in the
household may also migrate but are just as likely to be unemployed.

•

Male-headed households with young female members who are old enough to migrate for work in
Lesotho or South Africa. These female migrants are generally sent by their parents to find work
and remit the proceeds to the household. The migrants are usually unmarried but some are also
married.

•

Male-headed households in which the patriarch no longer migrates. The female spouse or partner
now migrates for work in place of their spouse.

•

Households headed by older female migrants who are widowed or no longer with their spouse and
who are forced to migrate for work or whose younger female household members (also) migrate.

Intra-household gender roles and dynamics and decision-making about who migrates and what happens to
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remittances varies considerably between these four different types of migrant-sending household. The
reasons for the emergence of these differently gendered households are discussed below.

2.4 Gender Patterns in Contemporary Migration from Lesotho

In the 1990s, a stagnant gold price led to a major period of declining production, mine closures and
retrenchments in South Africa’s gold mines (Tshitereke 2004). In 1990, there were around 376,000
migrant miners in the industry. By 2004, there were only 230,000, a total job loss of 140,000. Of those
who were left, around 50,000 were from Lesotho (Table 3.5). Between 1995 and 2006, the proportion of
Basotho miners in the total workforce fell from 30% to 17%. The impact of retrenchments on migrationdependent households in Lesotho was devastating for women and children (Seidman 1995; Coplan and
Thoalane 1995). When 50,000 Basotho miners lost their jobs, almost as many households lost their main
source of income (as benefits were soon exhausted). The proportion of households in Lesotho with at least
one household member working as a migrant on the South African mines declined from 50% in 1982 to
only 12% in 2002 (Boehm 2003: 5). Young males entering the labour market could no longer rely on
migration to the South African gold mines for employment. As Boehm (2003: 5) observes: “What used to
be the absolute economic backbone of Basotho villages and rural economies has been degraded into the
privilege of a few.”
After 2001, the increase in the gold price halted the dramatic decline of the South African gold industry
and employment levels increased once again.

1

However, the number of migrant miners from Lesotho

continued to fall (from 58,000 in 2000 to 46,000 in 2006). Under pressure from the South African
government to employ more locals, the mining companies met their needs by hiring internal migrants from
within South Africa.
Table 3.5: Mine Jobs in South Africa for Basotho Migrants (Average No. Employed)
Year
1990
1991
1992
1

Basotho Workers
99,707
93,897
93,519

Total Workers
376,473
354,649
339,485

% Basotho
26.5
26.5
27.5

The gold price increased from USD$260 per ounce in 2001 to USD$420 in 2004. It is now over
USD$900
12

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Source: TEBA

89,940
89,237
87,935
81,357
76,361
60,450
52,188
58,224
49,483
54,157
54,479
48,962
46,049
46,082

317,456
315,264
291,902
284,050
262,748
228,071
213,832
230,687
207,547
234,991
234,027
230,771
236,459
267,894

28.3
28.3
30.1
28.6
29.1
26.5
24.4
25.2
23.8
23.0
23.3
21.2
19.5
17.2

Boehm (2004) notes that young men rarely get jobs on the mines any more. According to the National
Union of Mineworkers, no new workers (‘novices’) have been recruited from Lesotho since 2002.

2

The decline in legal contract mine employment for male migrants in South Africa has had four spin-off
effects:
•

Male ex-miners and new male workseekers now migrate irregularly to South Africa to work in
lower-paying sectors such as construction and commercial agriculture;

•

An increase in irregular and regular female migration to South Africa as female household
members replace retrenched males and seek employment opportunities in economic sectors that
prefer to hire female employees (such as domestic service and commercial farming) (Coplan and
Thoahlane 1995; Sweetman 1995; Pule and Matlosa 2000; Magrath 2004);

•

A major increase in internal migration of young women to Lesotho’s new textile and garment
factories which hire a predominantly female workforce and

•

Older female households heads (widows and separated/divorced/abandoned women) have been
forced to migrate to look for work to support their own households.

2

Interview with Head of Lesotho Office: National Union of Mineworkers (NUM).
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There are three main reasons for the increase in female migration to South Africa. First, the collapse of
apartheid has made it easier for women to migrate and to find work in South Africa without being
constantly harassed and deported by the state. On the other hand, most are confined to low-paying,
exploitative jobs by their irregular status. Second, households that used to have a male miner as the
primary breadwinner are now increasingly impoverished. In order to make ends meet, female spouses and
young women in the households are migrating in their stead and remitting money home. This redefinition
of “traditional” gender roles within the household has led to considerable gender conflict between spouses
and between unemployed patriarchs and their migrant daughters.

Third, as one Focus Group participant noted, wages in South Africa for women are better than in Lesotho
(though still lower than for men):

More women are migrating to South Africa because of the difficulties they experience in life and
also because the jobs in South Africa offer more money when compared to what we get in Lesotho
for the same work we do in South Africa. For domestic work in Lesotho, a woman gets M250 per
month whereas in South Africa the minimum they get would be M900.

3

Other reasons given by respondents as reasons for migration (primarily from female-headed households or
households without a mine migrant) included poverty, hunger, landlessness, unemployment, widowhood
or abandonment, supporting AIDS orphans, no money for school fees or medical treatment or clothing.

Finally, some women are the primary or sole breadwinner for their families in impoverished, femaleheaded households. One widow described how her daughter’s separation had forced her to migrate:
My daughter was married, but is now separated. She had to migrate due to problems in her
household. Her husband was not prepared to settle the dispute they had. Their children were dying
of hunger and she asked me permission to leave. I see her migration as helping me because I no
longer have means. She is really helping me. Things were getting tough for me. The going would
be very tough without the money. Being that little, I can only use it for a few things.
3
4

Participant in Focus Group No 4: Female Remittance Recipients
Interview No 38, 2 January 2009.
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4

Her daughter has been working for three years as a domestic worker in South Africa, earning around
R10,000 a year, remitting about R3,000 back to her mother and two children who stay with the mother.
Female migration to South Africa would undoubtedly have become even more voluminous if it were not
for the dramatic growth in employment opportunities in Lesotho’s domestic textile industry. The industry
was stimulated after 2000 by Lesotho’s privileged status as a duty-free exporter to the US under that
country’s Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) (Lall 2005). The Act gave Lesotho-based textile
producers privileged access to the US garment market. Between 2000 and 2004, textile exports more than
doubled, the number of factories rose to 47 and the workforce to 50,000. Virtually all of the factories are
foreign-owned, the majority by Taiwanese investors. Over 90% of exports go to the US.
The textile companies hire an almost exclusively young, female workforce as women are seen as hardworking, more compliant and more desperate for jobs than men (Baylies and Wright 1993; Wright 1993;
Tanga and Manyeli 2007). Over 90% of Basotho employed in textile factories are young women, most of
whom are internal migrants. Basotho female textile workers have been characterized by Boehm (2006:
156) as the ‘new miners.’ As he notes: “The emerging employment opportunities, which have come in the
wake of the recent industrialization of Lesotho, have come to a group which is structurally different from
that of men, the ‘traditional’ breadwinners and wage earners” (Boehm 2006: 156; Rosenberg 2007) (see
Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2: Male Employment in South African Mines and Female Employment in Lesotho Garment
Factories, 1990-2006
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In many households young women have displaced young men as the primary wage-earners (Dyer 2001;
Boehm 2006: 5). However, there is a radical difference in wage-earning potential between male migrants
in the unionized South African mines and female garment workers in Lesotho. In 2002, for example,
miners earned an average of M2,900 per month, while garment workers received only M650 per month.
The situation was even worse in 2006, when miners were receiving a substantially higher wage of M4,500
a month, while the garment workers’ salaries had not changed. The demand for employment in the textile
factories far outstrips the supply, providing no incentive to employers to raise wages
Gender and racial discrimination in the South African labour market and in South African immigration
policy play a major role in the lives of migrants. This is clearly evident in the different occupational niches
that male and female migrants are able to access. The vast majority of male migrants are permitted to
legally into South Africa to work. Virtually all of the 80% of migrants who are miners are on legal
contracts. Only a small number (probably around 10%) are irregular migrants. While male migrant miners
are issued with one year residence and work permits, female migrants can only get 30 day visitor’s permits
and are in an irregular work situation. In the sectors in which women can get jobs, South African
employers cannot generally get them permits. A few women are legally recruited by South African
farmers but the majority have no option but to work as undocumented migrants.

The dominant employment sector for female migrants in South Africa is domestic service. Many internal
16

and international migrants are forced to work in this sector. Fully half of women migrants from Lesotho
are forced to work in this sector.

Table 3.6: Migrant Occupations in South Africa
Main occupation
Farmer
Agricultural worker
Service worker
Domestic worker
Managerial office worker
Office worker
Supervisor
Mine worker
Skilled manual worker
Unskilled manual worker
Informal sector producer
Trader/ hawker/ vendor
Security personnel
Business (self-employed)
Professional worker
Teacher
Health worker
Pensioner
Shepherd
Don't know
Total
Source: SAMP Household Survey

% Males
0.1
1.4
0.7
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.1
79.8
7.4
1.6
2.1
1.0
0.2
0.4
2.8
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.6
0.7
100.0

% Females
1.0
4.6
3.1
50.0
0.5
0.5
0.0
0.2
4.6
2.0
8.7
7.1
0.0
5.6
4.6
0.5
1.5
0.0
0.0
3.1
100.0

Total %
0.3
2.0
1.1
9.0
0.2
0.3
0.1
68.4
6.2
1.5
2.8
2.0
0.2
1.2
2.9
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.5
1.0
100.0

The commercial farming sector of the neighbouring Free State province of South Africa began hiring
regular and irregular Basotho migrants in large numbers in the 1990s (Johnston 1997, 2007; Ulicki and
Crush 2000, 2007). Most of the migrants are drawn from the most marginalized and poorest segments of
Basotho society and are hired on contract in Lesotho by farmers who come across the border to recruit.
Some migrants come across the border and seek work on their own. As one female respondent, Mama
Bokeng noted:
I work on the farms because there are no jobs in Lesotho and with the little that I get, I am able to
attend to almost all the basic needs of my family (her spouse and one child). On the farm I work
for 8 hours a day, seven days a week. When looking for farmwork, I go straight to the farms I have
17

worked on before and do not wait to be recruited in Lesotho although I know it is illegal to enter
into South Africa with a purpose of working without a contract. The passports of all the
farmworkers are kept by our supervisors so that they we do not leave the farm. Our movement is
restricted for security purposes.
The majority of migrant farmworkers are women. Another SAMP study of migration to the farms found
that there were significant differences between male and female migrants. Males were more recent
additions to the farm workforce, averaging 2.4 seasons as opposed to 3.7 for women. Eighty-five percent
of males had worked for 3 or less years compared with 66% of females. Female migrant workers were
significantly older than the men. Most female farmworkers were older women (often widowed or
divorced). About half of all farmworkers were married. However, many more men were single (31%
compared to 7% of women), while many more women were widowed (26% compared to 3% of men).

.

The majority of farmworkers (around 60%) are the only wage earners in their households, despite this
income being low-wage and primarily seasonal. When not working as seasonal farm labourers, 31%
(primarily male) are unemployed and engage in no income generating activity. Some women undertake
supplementary informal sector activity such as selling vegetables (12.5%), beer brewing (5.3%), piece
work (4.6%), herding (3.3%), carrying parcels (2.7%) and sewing (2%).
The majority of domestic workers are younger women who are relatively new entrants to the labour
market. (Table 3.7). While 23% of miners have five or less years of migratory experience, the equivalent
figure for domestic workers is 54%. Some 81% of domestic workers have 10 or less years of experience
compared to only 39% of miners.
Table 3.7: Length of Migratory Experience of Female Domestic Workers
Years of Migration
Experience

Domestic
Workers (%)

0-5
54.3
6-10
27.1
11-15
8.4
15-20
3.1
21-25
2.1
26-30
2.0
>30
3.0
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Domestic
Workers
(Cumulative %)
54.3
81.4
89.8
92.9
95.0
97.0
100.0
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Migrant Miners
(%)

Migrant Miners
(Cumulative %)

23.0
16.1
16.5
15.6
11.7
10.7
15.4

23.0
39.1
55.6
61.2
72.9
84.6
100.0

Twenty six percent of the domestic workers were unmarried while 43% were daughters of the household
and 22% spouses of household heads. Most striking is that 47% of the domestic workers were widows,
separated, divorced or abandoned. In other words, almost half of the migrants were women largely fending
for themselves and their dependents. Like migrant miners, the domestic workers also spend the greater
part of the year away from Lesotho (87% are away for 11 months at a time). Only 21% get home once a
month, 36% only once every six months and 20% once a year.

Table 3.8: Age of Migrant Domestic Workers
Age Group
%
15-19
1.5
20-24
6.7
25-29
13.3
30-34
15.6
35-39
20.3
40-44
11.1
45-49
13.3
50-54
12.6
55-59
10.4
>60
8.1
Total
100.0
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Although female migrants would much prefer to migrate and work legally in South Africa, not all can do
so. Male migrants working in industries such as construction are also generally working irregularly.
Irregularity exposes migrants to exploitation and abuse and gives them little recourse to the police or
justice system. As the Director of Immigration in Lesotho observed about migrant construction workers:
They get employed as casual labourers. Because of 2010 (Soccer World Cup), there are a number
of constructions going on. In the case of casual undocumented labourers, they are underpaid, work
long hours for less pay and at times their employers inform the police about them when it is time to
pay them and they have to run away leaving their wages behind.

5

The Director of Consular Affairs in the Department of Foreign Affairs confirmed that this abuse of migrant
worker’s rights was a deliberate strategy by employers to avoid having to pay for work performed:
5

Interview with Director: Immigration, Lesotho.
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There are a few types of these informal job opportunities, namely domestic service and
construction. Seemingly, domestic workers do not have as many challenges as those
in construction. Those who are not lucky face challenges such as not being paid. Most of the
construction company owners are involved in many businesses, and to boost those that are lagging
behind, they use the resources from those that are vibrant. These people are mostly respected
in the townships (by black South Africans) and they use that influence to chase away the Basotho
employees at the end of the month when they are supposed to be paid. They call locals to come and
chase away Basotho or call the police to inform them that there are illegal immigrants in the area.
Basotho are usually forced to leave without being paid.

6

The Director of Immigration said that female domestic workers in South Africa face similar exploitation:
We are aware of the agencies such as Household Helpers that hire domestic servants to go and
work in South Africa without following proper (legal) channels. This exposes Basotho nationals to
exploitation such as the employer keeping their passport to prevent them from going home as they
would like to, being underpaid and not enjoying similar benefits as South Africans doing the same
jobs.
Irregular employment tends to depress the wages paid to Basotho migrants, leaving them with less to remit.
Most women are paid below the minimum wage for domestic work and spend long hours (sometimes 7
days a week) working in isolated and isolating conditions on their employer’s property. Others live in
townships and informal settlements and have to spend a significant proportion of their wage on public
transport to and from work. Migrant women are also vulnerable to gender-based violence in the townships,
en route to work and at work. Women working on farms are constantly sexually harassed by male
supervisors and the incidence of rape is high. As irregular migrants, women have little protection from the
law. Indeed, the police are well-known for demanding bribes and sexual “favours” from undocumented
women in exchange for turning a blind eye to their presence in the country.

2.5 HIV/AIDS and Migration
The first identified case of HIV infection in Lesotho was in 1986. Initially, growth in HIV prevalence was
slow, only reaching 0.04% in 1990. For the next eight years, the rise was rapid, climbing from an
estimated 1.0% in 1991 to 30.5% in 1998 and to 37% at the present time. Data from antenatal clinics show
a rise in prevalence amongst pregnant women in the country’s main city, Maseru, from 5.5% in 1991 to
6

Interview with Director of Consular Services: Department of Foreign Affairs.
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42.2% in 2000 (Wilson 2001: 11).
There is a significant body of research in Southern Africa that identifies population mobility as one of the
major reasons for the rapid transmission of the disease throughout the region (see Crush et al 2005; Banati
2007; Coffee et al 2007). Certainly, its spread in Lesotho in the 1990s cannot be explained without taking
account of the extraordinary mobility of the population (Romero-Daza and Himmelgreen 1998). The
spread of HIV and AIDS has not simply been fuelled by migration. Migration, by its very nature,
facilitates high-risk behaviour and makes migrants more vulnerable to HIV infection.
The Lesotho Behavioral Surveillance Survey 2002 conducted interviews with miners, taxi-drivers and
assistants, soldiers, low-income migrant women (working in Lesotho, mainly in the textile industry) and
female sex workers (FHI et al 2002). Despite widespread knowledge of the causes and prognosis for those
with HIV and AIDS, rates of non-regular and multi-partner sex were high amongst all groups, not just sex
workers (FHI et al 2002; see also Makatjane 2002). Condom use was low and sporadic amongst all of
these groups of internal and international migrants. A Family Health International Study of the environs of
ten border posts between South Africa and Lesotho identified them as sites of “profound risk” where
commercial sex is widely available (Wilson 2001: 5; see also Waterman 2004). As Wilson (2001: 2)
concludes: “There is exceptional HIV vulnerability at each of the sites investigated, a sociocultural context
of casual and commercial sex exacerbated by profound mobility (of) truckers, bus and taxi drivers, traders,
soldiers, migrant laborers and transient workers.”
On the mines, a culture of macho male sexuality and the availability of commercial sex (often with female
migrant sex workers) led to the rapid diffusion of HIV amongst the mine workforce in the 1990s
(Campbell 1997; Meekers 2000). The introduction of HIV to Lesotho is widely attributed to returning
migrant miners infected with the virus while at work. As Wilson (2001: 5) notes, migrant labour to the
mines “readily transplants HIV risk from the mining camps to rural Lesotho.” Migration, which separates
and divides couples for extended periods of time, and the accompanying poverty, play a complex but
significant role in the sexual behaviour and preferences of migrants and their partners while apart (Kimane
et al 2004). The death of either partner has profound consequences, as one of the Focus Group
participants in this study observed:
Let us look at it this way. Some men do not come home when they are in South Africa. We may
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not know the reasons but many die there and their spouses are forced to go and look for jobs in
South Africa. While many women go to South Africa because of problems in their households the
risk is, when they fail to get those jobs, they get into sexual relations with many men from the
mines. They switch into prostitution and what then happens is that they contract HIV/AIDS. They
would be looking for let us say R20 from each man and in this way, each woman would be looking
for five or more men to get R100. The intention is to send money back home to the children and
leaving something for herself to eat. The result of all this is the man dies and she is also going to
7

die.

The 2004 Lesotho Demographic and Health Survey tested blood samples from throughout the country and
found: (a) rates were higher in all age categories for women than men (b) the peak age range for infection
was 30-34% for men and 35-39% for women; (c) after age 40 rates decline with age (GOL 2005).
Although urban prevalence is higher than rural for both men and women, rural prevalence is still
significant (33% versus 24% for women, 22% versus 18.5% for men) (Figure 2.3, Table 2.11).
Remoteness offers some protection but not a great deal. In Lesotho’s lowlands, where most of the
population lives, prevalence rates are 24.9%. In the remote mountainous areas of the country they are still
21%.

Figure 2.3: HIV Prevalence Amongst Women at Ante-Natal Clinics (%)
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Table 2.11: National HIV/AIDS Prevalence by Gender, Age and Spatial
Distribution
Age
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49

Women
7.9
24.2
39.8
39.3
43.3
29.1
16.8

Men
2.3
12.2
23.9
41.1
39.1
33.9
26.2

Total
5.3
19.5
33.3
40.0
41.8
30.6
20.0

Urban
Rural

33.0
24.3

22.0
18.5

29.1
21.9

Lowlands
Foothills
Mountains
Source: GOL (2005: 29)

28.0
24.2
23.3

20.4
16.9
17.6

24.9
21.2
21.0

HIV/AIDS is decimating Lesotho’s most economically-productive age cohort. It is also generating new
forms of migration. There is evidence that once migrants become too sick to work, they return home
permanently “to die” (Clark et al 2007). The loss of income for the family is often devastating when a
migrant becomes too sick to earn and remit. The impact is exacerbated by the fact that the burden and cost
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of care is also borne by the family. The other form of migration on the increase is children’s migration as
orphans are sent to live with extended family members in different parts of the country or in South Africa
(Young and Ansell 2003, Ansell and van Blerk 2004a, 2004b, van Blerk and Ansell 2006). The HIV/AIDS
epidemic is in many ways the crowning blow to agriculture, a crippling plague that has left many farmers
unable to do the hard physical labour required to work the land and many migrants without the physical
energy or resources to continue to migrate for work. Turner (2004) points out that “there is no doubt that
the pandemic will exacerbate poverty as the nation’s aggregate capacity to farm is reduced by sickness and
death.” Already HIV/AIDS is having a significant impact on food security in the rural and urban areas of
Lesotho (Mphale 2003).
Magrath (2004: 18) describes the following impacts of HIV/AIDS on households in Lesotho:
•

Increased household dependency ratios. Chronic illness and death in the working age population are
increasing the ratio of dependent consumers to producers in the household.

•

Changes in household headship. The death of male household heads is increasing the number of
widows and female-headed households.

•

Incomplete Households. One parent or one whole generation is missing.

•

Households with Additional Orphans. Orphans are the responsibility of the next of kin.

•

Orphan-Headed Households. These are apparently not as common in Lesotho as elsewhere but are
likely to increase in number.

•

Defunct Households. When both parents die, there are no resident adults and the children are dispersed
to live with relatives.

All of these changes in household structure, division of labour and livelihood strategies are increasing the
economic vulnerability of households. Households that experience the death of a migrant from HIV and
AIDS generally experience increased
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3.0 MIGRATION AND TRANSNATIONALISM
3.1 Changes in Household Composition
For much of the twentieth century, most migrants from Lesotho were the young sons of the household. A
major shift began to take place in the 1980s when mine jobs became more scarce and a Basotho miner was
no longer guaranteed that a younger, unmarried relative (a son or a grandson or a nephew) would take his
place on the mines. As a result, migrant mining became more of a “career.” Miners began to work
continuously in South Africa when, in earlier times, they might have stayed home for lengthy periods of
time between contracts. The mine workforce from Lesotho began to age. By 1997, the average age of
migrant miners was over 40 and 60% had more than 20 years mining experience (Sechaba Consultants
1997: 8-9). Since men continued to marry and start their own household at roughly the same age, the
proportion of married men and household heads in the migrant workforce inevitably increased.
The net result of these changes was that migrant men spent less and less time at home and became more
and more alienated from their own households and families. The proportion of divorced, separated and
abandoned women has always been higher in Lesotho than in other Southern African countries as a result
of the strains placed on relationships by migration. Now these strains were intensified as migrants worked
away from home for eleven months of the year, year in and year out.

Things were no better for the many thousands of households affected by mine retrenchments. In many
ways they got worse. Most miners had no alternate job skills, experience or opportunity. One study of
household poverty compared the same households in 1993 and 2002, showing that there were 129 miners
in 328 sampled households in 1993 (Wason and Hall 2004). By 2002, these same households had only 45
miners left (34 continuing and 11 new). The remainder were either farming, inactive or looking for work.
Only one who had come home had found alternative regular paid employment (Wason and Hall 2004: 35).
The Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) in Lesotho argues that retrenchments led to an increase in
divorce rates and domestic violence:
There is a high divorce rate within families of migrant workers. Mine workers and their spouses
have not had the chance to live together thus missing the important aspect of knowing one another
and making necessary compromises. When the husband comes to stay home permanently, there is
an air of mistrust and intolerance which leads to the marriage breaking up. Most men would
25

attribute this to lack of income. Frustration at being unable to provide for the family brings about
domestic violence which manifests itself both physically and emotionally. It is very unfortunate
that this country does not have any statutory laws to deal with situations such as this. The absence
of law on domestic violence makes it very difficult for law enforcement agencies to control it.

8

The retrenchment of Basotho miners also impacted severely on many households as the remittances dried
up, driving them deeper into poverty (Coplan and Thoahlane 1995; Boehm 2003, 2005).
One household response to the “return” of the men was an increase in migration by female household
members (Coplan and Thoahlane 1995; Gill-Wason 2004; Boehm 2006). This was confirmed in individual
interviews and in the Focus Groups. One widow, now in her 60s, observed:
During the time when we grew up, there were no woman migrants, but nowadays we
see women migrating and leaving men behind. Men have lost jobs and when this has
happened it is useless to be sitting together looking one another in the face with
nothing to eat.

9

Another woman noted that the switch was relatively rapid:
More women seek and find domestic jobs in South Africa because more men have been retrenched
and this is more than at any time. The problem in the households is that when men come back with
the (retrenchment) packages, there is very poor cash management that within less than a year all the
money is finished and it is only then that women find themselves with no alternative but to go.

10

Much of this replacement migration was to low paid jobs in South Africa that provide far less
remuneration than minework. There have always been women who needed to find wage work to survive.
Now there are many more of them and more are being forced to migrate for work.
At the household level, the rate of formation of new marital homes is declining and the age at which people
marry is increasing. Young men and women are remaining longer in their natal homes and the rate of
household fission has declined (Boehm 2006). In 1980, more than 80% of women were married by the age
of 30. One recent case study found that only 20% of women aged 18-30 were married (Boehm 2003). In
another area, the percentage of adults who were married had dropped from 38% in 1977 to 24% in 2004
8

Interview with Federation of Women Lawyers, Maseru.
Interview No 36, 2 January 2009.
10
Interview No. 18, 21 December 2008.
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(Turner 2004). The main reason, concludes Magrath (2004: 14), is that “men are struggling to find the
resources to marry, while women, especially those with an independent income, are choosing to delay or
avoid marriage, as they do not see it as being in their interests.”

The increase in the incidence of female household headship has been dramatic. The percentage of femaleheaded households jumped sharply from 25% of married women in 1993 to 40% a decade later. The
pattern of female-headed households in each age group has also shifted dramatically. In 1993, female
headship really only began in any significant manner after women reached the age of 50. By 2003, many
younger women had become household heads. There has also been an increase in the proportion of maleheaded households in which there is no spouse (Table 3.1). Women are dying earlier than in the past
because of AIDS, leaving husbands to care for the family. Then male mortality begins to increase, leaving
more women each year after the age 25 to care for the family. The shift had already begun by the year
1999. The change was even more pronounced by 2003, after more deaths had occurred, and the national
population had begun to fall.

Table 3.1: Female Headed Households in Each Age
Group
Age Group:

1993(%)
20-24
26
25-29
7
30-34
9
35-39
9
40-44
7
45-49
22
50-54
23
55-59
40
60-64
41
65-69
31
70-74
49
75-79
54
80-84
58
85-89
71
Total
25
Source: Sechaba Consultants

1999(%)
9
11
15
16
22
24
30
32
36
40
50
53
55
51
25

2003(%)
19
20
24
29
34
30
39
42
43
56
55
69
66
57
40
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3.2 Migration and Transnational Relationships
Gender differences in migration from Lesotho are clearly shaped by household structure and roles.
Overall, the household survey showed that male migrants are most likely to be in the ‘married’ category,
while female migrants are for the most part without husbands, either because they have not yet or never
married, or because their husbands have left them or died (Table 3.2). A much higher proportion of female
migrants are unmarried compared to their male counterparts: 25% of female migrants compared to just
below 10% of male migrants. This suggests that some women, whether by choice or necessity, are
selecting migration over marriage as their primary means of economic support, or at least are delaying
marriage until later in life (see also Boehm 2004). Among male migrants, 84% are married, whereas the
equivalent figure for female migrants is only just above a quarter.
Table 3.2: Marital Status of Migrants
Marital Status
Males (%)
Unmarried
9.7
Married
84.2
Cohabiting
0.3
Divorced
0
Separated
1.7
Abandoned
0.2
Widowed
3.9
Total
100
N
934
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Females (%)
25.0
26.5
0.5
4.6
15.3
3.6
24.5
100
196

Another important finding is the high proportion of female migrants giving their position in the family as
‘daughter.’ Over 50% of female migrants are younger members of households; either daughters,
daughters-in-law or nieces compared to only 22% who are sons, sons-in-law or nephews. This confirms
the new post-1990 trend, where young women are engaging in economic migration practices once
associated mainly with young men.

The differences between male and female migrants in levels of separation, divorce, abandonment and
widowhood are also significant. Almost half of the female migrants from Lesotho fall into these categories,
compared to only around 6% of the male migrants. This suggests that marital breakdown or loss of a
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husband act as significant drivers of female migration. Whatever the circumstances leading to the loss of a
male partner, these women are often the primary or sole breadwinner for their families in what have
become female-headed households. One widow described how her daughter’s separation had forced her to
migrate:
My daughter was married, but is now separated. She had to migrate due to problems in her
household. Her husband was not prepared to settle the dispute they had. Their children were dying
of hunger and she asked me permission to leave. I see her migration as helping me because I no
longer have means. She is really helping me. Things were getting tough for me. The going would
be very tough without the money. Being that little, I can only use it for a few things.

11

Her daughter has been working for three years as a domestic worker in South Africa where she earns
around R10,000 a year, remitting about R3,000 back to her mother and two children who stay with the
mother.

The incidence of female widowhood, divorce and separation in the Lesotho sample was not only higher
than for men, but also dramatically higher than the levels reported for female migrants in any of the other
countries surveyed. The fact that the unmarried, married, widowed and divorced/separated/abandoned
categories each contained roughly equivalent proportions of the total number of female migrants from
Lesotho is of fundamental importance in understanding the nature and impact of female migrants’
remittances, including who receives their remittances and how those remittances are spent.

The high incidence of widowhood and separation is further reflected in the proportion of women migrants
(24%) who are heads of households (Table 3.3). This reinforces the suggestion that female migration and
female household headship are causally linked. The absence of a male household head appears to
encourage female migration, whether because of the lack of local livelihood or employment options for
women, or due to the absence of patriarchal restriction on women’s migration by a male spouse.

11

Interview No 38, 2 January 2009.
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Table 3.3: Relationship of Migrants to Household Head
Relation
Head
Spouse/partner
Son/daughter
Father/mother
Brother/sister
Grandchild
Grandparent
Son/daughter-in-law
Nephew/niece
Other relative
Non-relative
Total
N
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Males (%)
76.5
0.1
21.8
0.0
0.5
0.4
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.6
0.0
100
934

Females (%)
24.0
18.4
45.4
1.0
1.5
1.5
0.0
5.1
0.5
2.6
0.0
100
196

In the past, most male migrants were young single men (Sechaba Consultants 1998). As many as threequarters of male migrants are now household heads compared to 25% of female migrants. While the
female figure is much lower, it does indicate that a sizable group of women not only have the responsibility
of being the head of their own household but have to migrate out of the country to ensure the survival of
the household.
Lubkemann (2002: 41-63) has written in Mozambique of the phenomenon of transnational polygyny, the
growing practice of marrying again in South Africa and maintaining households in both countries. No
direct questions were asked about this phenomenon in the household survey. However, it emerged as a
consistent theme (and concern) in all of the Focus Group discussions. Many participants observed that it
was increasingly common for migrant men to establish second households in South Africa. Sometimes
these were relationships with South African women (in which case the migrant could acquire South
African identity documents through marriage) and sometimes they were with migrant women from
Lesotho. The losers, from the perspective of people in Lesotho, were their households at home:
Most people we know, especially men, do have families in South Africa. In some cases
they even leave with other women from Lesotho to live with in South Africa. The new family in
South Africa puts a strain on the assistance the migrant brings to his original family in Lesotho. He
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now hardly ever sends or brings enough money to his Lesotho family, if at all.

12

A female participant put it more bluntly: “Households that do not have migrants really struggle to make
ends meet. But some also struggle as the husbands hardly ever sent a cent home and this could be because
they have families somewhere else.”

13

Another felt that this phenomenon was causing more women to

migrate:
Women migrate in large numbers because our husbands can no longer be relied upon.
Many of us still have husbands while the same number does not. I say men are unreliable
because when they get to South Africa, they enter into extra-marital affairs and remarry.
A man may actually leave home in the company of a local woman but sometimes he
marries a South African woman. This implies that some Basotho women really go to look
for jobs while others do not.

14

The growing practice of establishing a new relationship, family or household in South Africa also has a
clear gender dimension, according to respondents. Female migrants also have relationships with men in
South Africa. In the case of male migrants, the practice leads to a decreased flow of remittances to the
household in Lesotho. However, in the case of female migrants, it can actually augment rather than
reduce the flow of remittances to Lesotho:
Men often establish second families in South Africa so they have to share the money between two
families. With women, on the other hand, even if they find boyfriends in South Africa they send
15
the money the latter gives them home, together with the money they earn themselves.
One woman noted cynically that most men in this position “forget about their original families” while
women do not forget their families and children in Lesotho. A woman would rather take what her “men
friends” give her and send it to her children.

12
13
14
15
16

16

Participant in Focus Group 3: Male Remittance Recipients.
Participant in Focus Group 4: Female Remittance Recipients.
Interview No 35, 9 January 2009.
Participant in Focus Group 2: Female Migrants.
Interview No 33, 1 January 2009.
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3.3 Truncated Transnationalism
As noted in the previous chapter, cross-border movement between Lesotho and South Africa has increased
exponentially since the end of apartheid. Apartheid-era immigration laws ensured that legal migration
from Lesotho to South Africa was temporary, circulatory, and confined to certain categories of migrants
such as mineworkers. Those caught illegally in South Africa were summarily deported. Even legal
migrants could not take their families with them and they were forced to return home between contracts or
if they lost their jobs or became disabled or when they retired from the workforce. When in South Africa,
most male migrants were sequestered in mine hostels, isolated from everyday life around them and
encouraged to maintain their Basotho cultural identity. Migrants retained a strong affinity and attachment
to Lesotho. Even if they spent many years away over the course of their lifetime, Lesotho was seen as
“home.” In a sense, transnationalism was enforced by apartheid laws and migrants had little choice but to
assume a kind of truncated transnational identity: in South Africa but never fully of it; out of Lesotho but
always forced to return and maintain economic, family and cultural ties there. In a word, they were to
remain Basotho even when not physically there.

The question is whether this has changed with the collapse of apartheid. Migrants from Lesotho can now
go legally (or illegally) to South Africa without fear of constant harassment, imprisonment and deportation.
Most Basotho migrants have legal documentation to enter South Africa. A national survey in the late
1990s for example, showed that over 80% of adult Basotho have Lesotho passports (Gay 2000: 37). Of
those employed in South Africa, 91% have passports. There is thus no real need for people from Lesotho
to cross irregularly but many do simply because they live too far from an official border post. The border
between the two countries is unpoliced and extremely porous. South Africa deports over 250,000 irregular
migrants a year. Of these, only 5-10,000 are from Lesotho. In 2000, for example, the entry permits of
250,000 Basotho expired while they were in South Africa. However, only 6,180 people were deported to
Lesotho during that year (Sechaba Consultants and Associates 2002: 15). Policing of irregular migration
from Lesotho is lackluster at best, primarily because Basotho migrants ‘blend’ very easily into South
Africa.
Legal entry from Lesotho into South Africa for non-employment purposes (on visitor’s permits) is very
easy as apartheid-era restrictions have relaxed. How is freer movement between Lesotho and South Africa
restructuring traditional forms of truncated transnationalism? Migrants prefer to move and live and work
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legally in South Africa. However, outside the mining and commercial farming sectors, it is still hard for
them to obtain work permits since these have to be motivated for by employers. As a result, many
migrants (and women in particular) tend to enter South Africa legally and work in irregular fashion. This
category also includes workers who have migrated legally to work in South Africa and then illegally switch
employer or employment. Mine migrants are still employed on one-year contracts but they are no longer
as isolated from urban communities as they were in the apartheid years. Relatives find it easier to visit and
stay with their migrant spouses and parents at or near where they work.
In answer to the question “will the enclave empty?” Cobbe (2004) predicts that the process will proceed
much further and that the residents of impoverished Lesotho will increasingly leave their country for good
to settle in South Africa: “Given the large income differentials between the two countries, and Lesotho's
substantial disadvantages as a location for economic activity within Southern Africa, it is a safe prediction
that over the coming decades a substantial portion of Lesotho's population will move to South Africa, at
least for much of their working lives.” If this were to happen, it would probably have a major impact on
remittance flows to Lesotho. However, moving to South Africa is not the same thing as cutting all ties
with Lesotho, so it is unlikely that remittances would dry up all together. There is even an argument that
they might increase for as “new South Africans” they might have access to higher-paying and more secure
employment. The remitting behaviour of migrants who have moved permanently to South Africa is clearly
an issue for further research.
In the late 1990s, SAMP conducted a study of Basotho intentions and preferences vis-à-vis living in South
Africa versus staying in Lesotho. Around a quarter of the representative national sample of adult
respondents said they wished to live permanently in South Africa and thought it was likely they would do
so (Table 3.4). However, a greater number (51%) said they wished to live temporarily in South Africa and
60% said it was likely they would do so. There is clearly a massive pool of people who would entertain
moving to South Africa temporarily as migrants but retain strong ties with Lesotho. In other words, at least
two thirds of the population neither wished nor said it was is likely they would leave Lesotho for good. As
migrants, even with South African permanent residence or citizenship, they are likely to maintain strong
transnational ties with home.
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Table 3.4: Attitudes Towards Living in South Africa
Wish to live temporarily in SA
Wish to live permanently in SA
Likely to live temporarily in SA
Likely to live permanently in SA
Wish for SA permanent residence
Wish for SA citizenship
Wish to retire in SA
Wish to be buried in SA
Source: SAMP

%
51
24
60
25
35
36
29
19

Around half of the total adult population said they wanted to migrate temporarily to South Africa and a half
did not (Table 3.5). The desire was strongest for those in the 15-24 age group (59% with a strong or
moderate desire) and weakest for those over 45 (45%). It was also stronger for males (57%) than females
(45%) and stronger for household heads (49%) than their partners (43%).

Table 3.5: Level of Desire to Live in South Africa Temporarily

15-24 years old
25-44 years old
>44 years old
Male
Female
Household head
Spouse
Other member
Source: SAMP

Not At All
(%)
29
39
49
33
45
41
50
25

Not Much
(%)
12
12
6
10
10
10
7
14

To Some
Extent (%)
41
35
30
38
33
35
32
40

To A Great
Extent (%)
18
14
15
19
12
14
11
22

One of the objectives of migrants from Lesotho is to obtain South African identity documents or IDs
(permanent residence or citizenship status). In the survey, 35% wanted to obtain permanent residence
status in South Africa and 36% wanted South African citizenship (Table 3.4). They are perfectly aware of
the benefits that this confers. In 1996, for example, 34,000 long-serving migrant mineworkers from
Lesotho acquired South African permanent residence in an immigration amnesty (Sechaba Consultants
1997). Most took up the offer in order to make migration between Lesotho and South Africa easier and to
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be able to stay in South Africa and find other jobs when they were retrenched from the mines. In 1996,
permanent residence was offered to all longstanding irregular migrants in South Africa. There were 15,167
applications by people from Lesotho and 8,193 residence permits were granted (Crush and Williams 1999).
A South African ID makes a great difference to employment prospects, as a female migrant from one
Focus Group pointed out:
Getting to South Africa and staying and working there is not a problem. But it is not easy to access
good work in South Africa as almost all migrants don’t have South African IDs (Identity
Documents). When you have a South African ID you are able to get better work than people who
hold only Lesotho passports. If you are offered a good job you fail to secure it because you only
have a Lesotho passport and end up having to do low-paying jobs such as domestic or shop work.
This goes even for those people with high school education.

17

The value of South African documentation was clearly recognized by migrants (see Case Study 4).
Although fraudulent South African identity and citizenship documentation is always available at a price,
some Basotho are able to acquire them through formal application. Basotho in South Africa and Lesotho
are ethnically and linguistically homogenous (there are actually more Sesotho-speakers in South Africa
than in Lesotho). It is therefore relatively easy for a direct or distant relative to vouchsafe for the migrant’s
South African ‘roots.’

According to Cobbe (2004), 37% of people interviewed in a 2003 sample survey reported a family
member working in South Africa, 26% reported a family member permanently settled there, and 18%
‘admitted’ to possessing South African identification documents. If he is correct, the proportion with
family members ‘permanently settled’ in South Africa would have risen since, as would the proportion
with South African IDs. Interestingly, the interviews for this study found a considerable appetite for
acquiring South African documentation but little, if any desire to settle permanently in South Africa. This
is consistent with a SAMP study in the late 1990s which found that across every social, cultural and
economic indicator (with the exception of employment opportunities), a representative sample of adults
preferred Lesotho as a place to live. One key informant did note that ‘abandonment’ of Lesotho seemed to

17

Participant in Focus Group 2: Female Migrants.
35

be less of an issue for the young, university-educated Mosotho who, after graduating from a South African
university or college, simply stays on.
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Case Study 4 : Becoming ‘South African’
The textile industry in Lesotho employs over 40,000 young women. Most of these internal migrants would
probably go to South Africa as migrants if they were retrenched or the factories were to close, which is
always a possibility. Some women started working in the textile industry and then decided to go to South
Africa to look for better jobs. Moliehi Letola is one of them.
Letola is a single mother with two sons aged 18 and 7 in Lesotho. Both of her parents are dead and she
decided to go to work in South Africa to earn money to feed her sons and to put her children through
school. She has been migrating to South Africa for nine years and spends eleven months away at a time.
While she is away her two sons are left to fend for themselves: “It is not a good thing as my children
remain here alone when I am at work and that I don’t like at all.” She earns R14,000 a year as a domestic
worker. From these paltry wages, she is able to send her sons around R6,000 a year, primarily because her
own costs at work are low: “I don’t pay transport, rent or buy food.” Still, she says, the money is better
than it was in the textile factories and the working conditions are “good.” She does not trust informal
remittance channels and sends the money home through a bank. Her older son accesses the money from
the bank in Lesotho and the two boys use the money for food, rent, clothing and school fees (for the
eldest).
Letola makes a little extra through her membership of a stokvel (money company). She contributes R150
a month. The stokvel loans out money to its members and to others. The capital and profits are divided
between the members at the end of the year “to buy groceries for Christmas holidays.” That is the extent
of her extra money-making activity.
Letola has managed to acquire a South African passport though she does not say how. This at least means
that she does not need to return to Lesotho every 30 days to renew her permit. It also means that she is
treated well “unlike how they treat other Africans from other countries.” In fact, she no longer even uses
her Lesotho passport. She says that she will keep going to South Africa as long as there is work.
However, she is also considering migrating to South Africa with her two children. She says there are more
benefits available to her as a South African citizen and it would also be easier for her to have her own
house.
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Does this mean that the “enclave will empty” or that transnational forms of migration will continue or even
become more extensive? The evidence suggests that the probability of migrants maintaining strong ties
with Lesotho is very high. Nearly two thirds of the migrants (61%) identified in the household survey
return to Lesotho from South Africa at least once a month (compared with a regional average of only
36.3%) (Table 3.6). A total of 85% return home at least once every three months and 93% at least once
every six months. Again the frequency of personal home visits is much higher than the regional average of
45% every three months and 54% every six months.
Table 3.6: Frequency of Home Visits
How often does the migrant come home?
Twice or more per month
Once a month
More than once in 3 months
Once every 3 months
Once every 6 months
Once a year
At end of the contract
Other
Total
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Lesotho (%)
1.5
55.6
9.2
15.2
8.1
8.2
0.2
2.2
100.0

Region (%)
6.2
30.1
9.0
12.5
9.7
18.5
2.6
11.4
100.0

One of the primary indicators of transnationalism – simultaneous embeddedness in two societies – is
clearly a feature of modern migration between Lesotho and South Africa. Migrants return to Lesotho
extremely frequently and households in Lesotho maintain very regular contact with their migrant members.
Their remittance behavior (see Chapter 4.0) is the clearest indication of all of the transnational character of
migration between the two countries.

3.4 Migrant Associations
The frequency of return home and the isolation of many migrants while at work means that there are few
organized Basotho “immigrant associations and diaspora organizations” as traditionally conceived in
developed countries. There are, however, various kinds of cultural organizations in which migrants
participate when in South Africa, including churches, sports and entertainment.
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There are also two types of Basotho migrant association in South Africa which make use of earnings, and
both have a long history of modest success. One is the burial society, which takes in money and then
distributes it when a member or a relative dies. The second is a stokvel (or money company), which
obligates each of its members to contribute an amount each month to a common pool. The total sum is
given each month in turn to one of the members. Members can also borrow money from the group at a
modest rate of interest, so that the group can build up its resources. However, this money is rarely if ever
used to start a business. Rather it is used for purposes of local consumption or is remitted to Lesotho as
payment or school fees or purchases of large items to avoid having to buy them on monthly terms.

A third, and more socially ambiguous, form of migrant association amongst male Basotho migrants in and
around mines and urban townships in South Africa is the Marashea (or Russians) (Kynoch 2005). These
gangs of young migrants provide financial aid from group funds for members' medical, legal, burial and
funeral costs, as well as promoting cultural activities. However, the Marashea have a notorious proclivity
for violence and the production of a macho male identity through the control of women. The Marashea are
recognizable in Lesotho by the red blankets that they wear and are believed to invest the proceeds of
migrancy and criminality in business ventures in Lesotho, particularly in the taxi industry.
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4.0 REMITTANCES TO LESOTHO: A GENDER ANALYSIS
4.1 Economic Significance
4.1.1 Macro-Significance of Remittances
Globally, remittances have grown to the point where they exceed Official Development Assistance (ODA)
and are approaching the level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Figure 4.1). In Africa as a whole, the
picture is rather different with ODA now exceeding FDI (Figure 4.2). Remittance flows are significantly
lower (although data deficiencies are such that the actual flows may be much higher). Lesotho presents a
still different scenario with remittances being most important, followed by Customs Union Revenue, ODA
and finally FDI (Figure 4.3)
Figure 4.1: Global Flows of FDI, ODA and Remittances to Developing Countries
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Lesotho’s major external sources of revenue include:
•

Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Revenue: SACU governs trade for the member countries of
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and South Africa. The Union has a common external tariff
and guarantees free movement of goods amongst member countries. SACU’s revenue-sharing formula
has generated a growing proportion of public revenue in Lesotho, rising from M374 million in 1993 to
M1,107 million in 2003;
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Figure 4.2: Flows of FDI, ODA and Remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa
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Figure 4.3: Flows of FDI, ODA, Remittances and SACU Revenue to Lesotho
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•

Official Development Assistance: Lesotho’s ODA inflows fell dramatically after the end of apartheid
from M472 million in 1993 to M189 million in 1999. After 1999, however, ODA to Lesotho picked up
again primarily because of international attention on the impact of the HIV and AIDS epidemic;

•

Foreign Direct Investment: FDI increased throughout the 1990s with the growth of the textile industry
(peaking in 1998 at M1,404 million when the textile industry was at the height of its expansion) but has
fallen by 50% since; and

•

Migrant Remittances: throughout this period, migrant remittances have remained the major revenue
source for Lesotho, rising from an estimated M1,193 million in 1993 to M1,939 million in 2004.

4.1.2 Micro Significance of Remittances
Remittance flows from South Africa to Lesotho can be classified according to whether they are:
(a) compulsory or voluntary; (b) formal or informal (in terms of channels used); and (c) in cash or kind.
Remittances in cash and kind are the main source of income for the vast majority of migrant-sending
households in Lesotho. The survey showed that some 95% of households receive regular cash remittances
and 20% receive remittances-in-kind (Table 4.1). Only 9.5% of the households receive income from
regular wage work and 6.3% from casual work in Lesotho. Additionally, only 8.8% receive income from a
formal or informal business and just 2.7% from the sale of farm products.
Annualised average household income for migrant-sending households from all sources was M11,475.
Mean household income from cash remittances was M8,400 for cash and M2,488 for goods. Income from
other sources was relatively significant for the small number of households that had more diversified
income. For example, the 2% of households with a formal business made an average of M6,708 from their
business. Or again, the 3% of households selling farm produce made an average of M1,525 from those
sales. The 7% of households participating in the informal sector made an average of M3,066 from those
operations. In many cases, remittances are not a supplementary form of household income, they are
virtually the only form of income.
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Table 4.1: Sources of Income of Migrant-Sending Households
Wage work
Casual work
Remittances – money
Remittances – value of goods
Income from farm products
Income from formal business
Income from informal business
Pension/disability
Gifts
Source: SAMP Household Survey

%
9.5
6.3
95.3
20.0
2.7
2.0
6.8
0.6
2.2

Mean Annual Income (M)
7,420.83
2,618.28
10,186.44
2,487.70
1,525.93
6,708.00
3,066.41
1,025.00
1,178.86

4.2 Volume and Type of Remittances
4.2.1 Mine Remittances
The only completely accurate and reliable data on remittance flows is for compulsory deferred pay (CDP)
from the South African mining industry to Lesotho. These remittances are “formal” in that they are
channeled through the formal banking system and are captured in official statistics.
In 1974, the government passed the Lesotho Deferred Pay Act (Act No. 18 of 1974) which established the
legal terms and conditions of a compulsory remittance system for mineworkers (Sparreboom and
Sparreboom-Burger 1995). A portion of the miner’s wage (initially between 60-90%) was compulsorily
deferred and paid into a special account in the Lesotho National Development Bank. Miners received
some interest on their deposits, the balance accruing to the government. The funds could only be drawn in
Lesotho by the miner himself at the end of a contract. The CDP system ensured that the greater part of a
migrant’s earnings returned as remittances to Lesotho.
The Deferred Pay Act has been amended several times. A 1979 revision stipulated that 60% of the basic
wage would be deposited in Lesotho with the exception of earnings during the first 30 days of employment
on a contract. In 1990, the percentage of compulsorily deferred pay was reduced to 30% (excluding the
first and last month of the contract). Currently, miners are forced to defer 30% of their gross earnings for
10 months of every 12 month contract. Deferred wages can be accessed by the miner or their bona fide
spouse. The recent failure of the Lesotho National Development Bank and widespread dissatisfaction
amongst miners with the way the system operated prompted TEBA Bank to reach an agreement with the
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government about taking over the system.18 TEBA Bank now operates an automated deferred pay system
although there is still dissatisfaction amongst miners and their spouses about the way the system runs.
There is a common but misleading assumption that the decline in employment on the South African mines
for Basotho migrants must have led to a serious decline in remittance flows to Lesotho (Hassan 2002;
Makoae 2006; UNDP-Lesotho 2007). In fact, remittances actually increased over the time period as the
total wages paid out to Basotho miners grew from M1,473 million in 1992 to M2,442 million in 2004. The
average mine wage increased from M12,000 in 1992 to M53,000 in 2007 (Table 4.2). The CDP system
ensured that Lesotho received a portion of this increase (from M276 million in 1992 to M610 million in
2004). However, the Central Bank of Lesotho estimates that voluntary remittances have also grown (from
M1,103 million in 1992 to M1,795 million in 2004). In other words, the Lesotho economy as a whole has
not suffered from retrenchments. Nor have those households who have members working on the mines.
The primary impact of retrenchments is that a growing overall mine remittance package is shared by a
shrinking number of households. Households who do still have a mine worker migrant are clearly better
off than those who do not, and constitute something of a “rural aristocracy” (see Case Study 5).
Table 4.2: Mine Remittances to Lesotho from South Africa
Year

Total Wages
(M million)
1992
1473.5
1993
1551.4
1994
1641.5
1995
1743.0
1996
1951.9
1997
2032.7
1998
1996.2
1999
1897.4
2000
1955.5
2001
1966.6
2002
2196.5
2003
2364.8
2004
2442.1
Source: GOL

Average Annual
Wage (M)
12,321
13,359
14,562
16,801
19,186
21,193
24,678
27,657
30,131
32,030
35,236
38,513
42,116

Remittances
(M million)
1103.8
1104.5
1170.5
1242.8
1391.7
1321.2
1217.7
1157.4
1394.3
1402.2
1594.8
1686.1
1795.0

18 Interview with Regional Manager: TEBA
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CDP
(M million)
275.9
334.4
320.0
410.6
488.0
508.2
499.1
474.4
488.9
491.7
549.1
591.2
610.5

Case Study 5: The Rural Aristocracy
Migrant mineworkers are sometimes seen as the “rural elite.” In Lesotho, 50,000 men are employed on
legal contract in the unionized South African mining industry. Mine jobs are difficult to secure but those
who have them can count on wages that most unskilled and semi-skilled migrants can only dream of
earning. Miners are always vulnerable to the looming threat of retrenchments and mine closures, but those
who work on profitable mines and keep their jobs should, in theory, be in the best position to use their
earnings to invest in other income-producing activities. Given also that 50% of the wage packet is
compulsorily deferred to Lesotho, remittances are available for use at home.
Thuso Molapo is a 32 year old miner who has been working on the South African mines since he was 23:
“I would never settle in South Africa. I am just there to earn a livelihood for my family.” Unable to find
work in Lesotho (and with only a primary school education), his now-deceased father took him to South
Africa and managed to find him a mine job. His father had been a mineworker when younger and still had
contacts on the mines. Molapo is away in South Africa for 11 months each year and spends one month
back in Lesotho in December-January. He tries to return home for a weekend visit at the end of every
month but finds transportation to home difficult once he arrives in Lesotho.
Molapo’s earnings support eight other people. He is separated from his wife so his sick mother is the de
facto household head and makes most of the decisions about how the remittances will be spent. There are
five other adults and four children in the household. Two of the adults are his younger sisters. One works
in a shop in South Africa but does not remit. The other looks after the four children. He has two young
sons (aged 2 and 4) and he also has two nieces. One is the orphaned child of another sister and one is a
child that his late father adopted. There are also two unrelated young men in the household, both of whom
are unemployed.
Molapo earns R48,000 per year. R18,000 is remitted as compulsory deferred pay and he voluntarily remits
a further R6,000 which he usually brings in person. He also buys goods in South Africa for his household,
especially clothing for the children, and brings them home with him. Last year the bulk of his remittances
went on food (approximately R4,000), clothing (R3,000), transport (R6,000), building a house (R6,000)
and special events (R3,000). The rest was spent on medical expenses, fuel, alcohol and tobacco. Since his
mother got sick, he also pays someone to hoe her field. Molapo paid for the funeral of a cousin and
provided food for an uncle this year. He has no other source of income, does not have a business and has
no plans in that regard. Once all of the household expenses are covered, there is very little discretionary
income left.

In 1992-3, at the beginning of the period of retrenchments, the Central Bank of Lesotho conducted a survey
of the remitting behaviour of migrant miners (Central Bank of Lesotho 1995). Key findings included:
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•

Basotho miners send home an average of 49% of their earned income as cash remittances (CDP plus
other formal and informal cash transfers) and 25% as remittances-in-kind. Total monthly remittances
as a percentage of earnings were therefore 71%. CDP at the time was 30% indicating a significant
level of additional remittance flow.

•

Cash remittances were positively correlated with job and skills level and with marital status. Single,
separated, divorced or widowed mineworkers made smaller remittances than married miners.

•

Amount of remittances was also impacted by the size of family. The larger the family and number of
dependents, the larger the remittance. This correlation applied to both cash remittances and
remittances-in-kind.

•

Half of the miners did not have access to any fields in Lesotho. Landlessness was more prevalent
among younger than older miners. Three quarters of miners had no livestock at home.

•

Rates of investment in entrepreneurial activity were extremely low. Only 1% of miners had business
enterprises. Over half of these were small cafes. Asked if they planned to start a business if they were
retrenched, 55% had no plans. The rest planned to open cafes or shebeens (bars).

Perhaps the most controversial finding of the study was that the vast majority of miners preferred the CDP
system. This finding was directly contradicted by a 1997 SAMP study of miner behaviour and preferences
(Sechaba Consultants 1997: 22) which found that 64% wanted deferred pay to be made optional (compared
to only 9.5% of miners’ spouses). Most of those who found CDP a problem cited low interest rates and
difficulty of access. Sixty five percent of those who preferred an optional system said they should have the
right to manage their finances privately. The study found that miners were sending home 71% of their
income in cash or kind in the late 1990s (Sechaba Consultants 1997: 37-8).
The household survey for this report showed some continuities and changes in remitting behaviour since
the Central Bank Survey:
•

Basotho miners now send home an average of 60% of their earned income as cash remittances (25% as
CDP and 35% in voluntary remittances. This is an increase of 10% from the early 1990s.

•

Remittances in cash and kind constitute an average of 80% of the income of mine migrant-sending
households. The vast majority (96%) of miners send money home voluntarily at least once a month, in
addition to CDP.
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•

Cash remittances are still positively correlated with job and skills level and with marital status. Single
mineworkers make smaller remittances than married miners.

•

The amount of remittances is correlated with the number of dependents. The larger the number of
dependents, the larger the package. Households with children also tend to receive more in remittances
than those without.

4.2.2 Other Cash Remittances
The household survey showed that female migrant domestic workers in South Africa remit much less than
male miners, which is not surprising given the wage differentials between the two sectors. On average,
female domestics remit an average of M3,632 per annum (one third of that of miners). Remittances are also
less frequent than those of miners, most of whom remit once a month or more. Only 42.5% of domestic
workers are able to remit that frequently. Another 20% remit once every 2-3 months and the rest even less
often.
Most voluntary remittances flow through informal channels and go unrecorded. What is clear is that the
vast majority of migrant-sending households do receive remittances in cash, kind or both. Some 95% of
migrant-sending households in Lesotho receive cash remittances. Remittances are frequent and regular:
78% of households receive cash remittances at least once a month (Table 4.3). The average annual cash
remittance receipt reported by households was M7,800.

There is a debate in the remittances literature about whether higher-paid skilled migrants remit more than
those who are less-skilled and lower-paid. In the case of Lesotho, there are distinctive differences in
remitting patterns by skill level. Miners remit an average of M10,677 per annum which is more than
skilled workers and professionals (M6,260) who, in turn, remit more than other migrants (mainly unskilled
women) who remit an average of M3,939 per annum.
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Table 4.3: Frequency of Cash Remittances to Lesotho
Twice or more per month
Once a month
More than twice in 3 months
Once in three months
Once every 6 months
Once a year
At end of the contract
Other
Don't know
Total
Source: SAMP Household Survey

N
12
787
91
66
16
51
2
0
2
1027

%
1.2
76.6
8.9
6.4
1.6
5.0
0.2
0.0
0.2
100.0

4.2.3 Remittances In Kind
The “remittance package” of migrants from Lesotho includes cash and in kind. Goods are purchased by
migrants where they work and then sent or brought home to Lesotho. The proximity of the two countries
makes this a feasible option, particularly since there is a greater range of consumer goods in South Africa
and prices are generally lower. In addition, as members of a common customs union, there should be no
duty to pay when migrants bring goods home. In practice, customs officials at official border posts do
demand duty or are known to accept bribes for turning a blind eye. The survey showed that 20% of
migrant-sending households had received remittances in kind in the month prior to the survey. The
average annual value of goods remitted to Lesotho was R2,487 (compared to R10,186 in cash remittances).
4.4 Characteristics of Remittance-Receiving Households
Four basic types of migrant-sending and remittance-receiving households were identified by the national
household survey (Table 4.5):
•
•
•
•

Female-centred: No husband/male partner; may include relatives, children, friends;
Male-centred: No wife/female partner; may include relatives, children, friends;
Nuclear: Man and woman with or without children;
Extended: Man and woman and children and other relatives and non-relatives

The vast majority of male Basotho migrants (nearly 90%) come from nuclear and extended family
households. Only 55% of female migrants come from such households. A significant minority (43%)
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come from female-centred households in which there is no husband or male partner (Table 4.5).
Table 4.5: Migrant-Sending Household Typology
Female Centered
Male Centered
Nuclear
Extended
Total
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Male Migrants
7.0
3.8
43.3
45.9
100

Female Migrants
42.9
0.7
18.6
37.8
100

How do migrant-sending households compare with those that do not have migrant members? In another
survey, SAMP collected data which compared income for migrant-sending households with a national
sample of all households (Table 4.6) (Green 2006a). Over half of the national sample (52%) reported an
annual cash income of less than M2,500 compared to only 12% of migrant-sending households. Again,
75% of the national sample have an income of less than M7,500 (compared to 55% of the migrant-sendinghouseholds). In other words, while the vast majority of all households have very low incomes, the
migrant-sending households are clearly better off.

Table 4.6: Distribution of Household Income
Household Income
Group (M)

National Sample

%
0-2499
51.8
2,500-4,999
14.8
5,000-7,499
7.9
7,500-9,999
6.3
10,000-12,499
5.6
12,500-14,999
3.3
15,000-17,499
1.6
17,500-19,999
2.2
20,000-22,499
0.8
22,500-24,999
1.1
25,000-27,499
0.3
27,500-29,999
0.3
30,000-32,499
0.3
32,500-34,999
0.2
35000 and up
3.3
Source: SAMP Data Base

Migrant-Sending Households

Cumulative %
51.8
66.6
74.5
80.9
86.4
89.8
91.3
93.5
94.4
95.5
95.8
96.2
96.5
96.7
100.0
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%
12.2
10.4
16.7
15.6
15.1
9.2
4.9
4.9
2.1
2.7
1.3
0.6
0.7
0.4
3.2

Cumulative %
12.2
22.6
39.3
54.9
70.0
79.2
84.1
89.0
91.1
93.8
95.1
95.7
96.4
96.8
100.0

4.3 Remittance Channels
The CDP system linking Lesotho with the South African mines is the primary channel for remittance
flows. Outside the system, the most popular ways of remitting are informal in nature. This is true for
Lesotho and the region as a whole (Table 4.7). Migrants bring the money themselves (54%) or send it via
a trusted friend or co-worker (33%). Very few use formal money transfer systems; for example, only 5.1%
use the Post Office and only 1.8% use banks. Easily the most popular way of sending goods home is to
bring them personally (82%). A smaller number entrust them to friends or co-workers (12%). But only
4% use official rail transport channels and less than 1% entrust their goods to the taxis that ply the routes
between Lesotho and the South African towns where they work.

Table 4.7: Major Remittance Channels
Cash
Lesotho %
Post Office
5.1
Wife's TEBA account
1.8
Bring personally
54.1
Via a friend/ co-worker
33.4
Via Bank in home country
1.8
Via TEBA own account
0.7
Bank in South Africa
0.9
Via Taxis
0.2
Bus
0.0
Rail
Other method
1.9
Total
100.0
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Goods
Region %
7.1
3.1
46.8
26.2
6.1
3.3
0.8
1.5
1.1
3.9
100.0

Lesotho %
0.7
81.9
11.8
0.7
3.8
0.0
0.7
100.0

Region %
4.2
66.0
14.7
3.5
5.2
1.3
2.9
100.0

Considerable attention is given in the remittance literature to the methods that migrants use to remit and the
expense involved in remitting, through both formal and informal channels. The main policy
recommendation is that governments and private sector institutions at both ends should lower the
transaction costs of remitting, as well as make it easier for migrants to access and use formal channels
through reform of banking and other financial regulations. In the case of Lesotho, hand-to-hand transfer of
cash and goods is easily the most important channel (Case Study 6). It is hard to see how transaction costs
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on personal transactions can be reduced unless the reason for return home is only to transfer remittances, in
which case transportation costs make this a very costly means of remitting.
Using friends and co-workers to carry cash and goods home is also relatively popular and, once again,
quite feasible given geographical proximity. Insofar as problems arise, these seem to pertain mainly to
slowness and theft. Very few migrants cite either the cost of transactions or the lack of banking facilities
as a problem for them. Basotho migrants do not generally see that there is a problem in need of a solution.
This does not mean, of course, that if cost-effective financial services were available, migrants would not
use them. Some certainly might. But for the moment, most seem happier to take remittances with them
when they go home.
The survey confirms very low usage of formal institutions for money transfer between South Africa and
Lesotho. The problem is not in moving money as both countries are members of the Rand Monetary Area
(RMA). The Rand is legal tender in Lesotho (though not vice-versa). Many South African banks have
branches in Lesotho but few migrants use the banks to remit. Generally, there is very low access to
financial services in Lesotho (Genesis Analytics 2003b: 22). Most migrants do not have bank accounts
with the main banks and the costs of transfer, even within the RMA, are prohibitive. Bank products cost
around R150 per transaction because banks charge a SWIFT fee and commission on each transaction even
when funds are transferred to subsidiaries of the same bank in Lesotho (Genesis Analytics 2003a: vi). A
transfer to Maseru in Lesotho costs 700% more than a transfer to Ladybrand on the South African side of
the border only kilometers away (Genesis Analytics 2003a: ix). Undocumented Basotho migrants cannot
open bank accounts in South Africa as a work permit is required to open a resident or non-resident account
(Genesis Analytics 2005: 12) .
In late 2004, four major South African banks plus the Post Office launched a new product in South Africa
– the Mzansi account – designed to improve access to financial services for the poor. Mzansi account
transactions are priced significantly lower than normal bank accounts and make transacting easier. By
mid-2005, over a million accounts had been opened (Genesis Analytics 2005: 46). The potential of Mzansi
for remittance transfers (via inter-bank transfers) has yet to be realized although the scheme has been
developing a Money Transfer System based on the Western Union model. Mzansi is not available, as yet,
in Lesotho.
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Case Study 6: Informal Remittance Channels
Matoebe Lehasa is 42 years old and has been a migrant for two years, ever since her husband became too
sick to continue working on the South African mines. Until she was 40, she had stayed in Lesotho and
looked after the household and children while her husband was away. They have four children: two boys
aged 21 and 16 and two girls 8 and 4. Last year her oldest son, who has a secondary school education but
could not find a job in Lesotho, also went to South Africa to work as an unskilled labourer. Lehasa
actually believes that it is better for women to go to work in South Africa these days “because every time
you hear stories from men that there is no money, no work, or the job they were doing is finished.”
Lehasa says she migrated because her husband was unable to work anymore and “sitting together at home
without a breadwinner made us reach a decision for me to go and fend for the family.” However, she had
an additional motive: “I wanted to earn some more money so that I could come back home and start some
small business (a spaza shop).” She was told of an employment agency north of Pretoria that was placing
Basotho domestic workers with South African employers. She went there and got a job. As a domestic
worker, like many of her fellow female migrants from Lesotho, she earns R12,000 a year. She is able to
remit R10,000 a year which last year went primarily on food (R7,000), clothing (R1,000), fuel (R1,500) ,
hiring a tractor to plough their field (R500) and “a small packet of seed to sow in my field.” Around 60%
of the household income therefore goes on food purchase. She has two “remittance channels”:
I post the money home or bring it myself after two months. This money is received by my
husband. I do not make the decisions as to how the money I send is to be used. I send it to him
because he is the one taking care of the children. I think this money makes a difference in
providing food, for without it my children would die of hunger. One of my sons has to repeat
Standard 7 (in high school). He only got a third class pass but I do not know if the money I send
will be enough to send him to school.
Lehasa says she wants to save money but is unable to do so. And when she does, she anticipates that her
savings will not go towards her planned business but on the victims of HIV and AIDS: “There are many
deaths these days and the money saved would help in the burial of members of my household or me.”
She has a Lesotho passport and is working without a work permit. In order to remain legally in South
Africa she needs to renew her visitor’s permit once a month back at the Lesotho-South Africa border. The
alternative is to overstay and then have to pay a bribe of M150 to M200 demanded by officials at the
border when she returns to Lesotho.
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The Post Office is probably the most used formal channel (but only by 5% of migrants). The Post Office is
empowered by South African law to remit outside the country via money order or postal order but
transaction costs are high (R30.50 for a R300 money order and R51.75 for a telegraphic money order)
(Genesis Analytics 2006: 6). Oganizations such as Western Union and MoneyGram do not operate in
Lesotho. Western Union began operating in South Africa in 1995 and expanded rapidly (and might have
spread to Lesotho). However, it withdrew after new South African Reserve Bank regulations made it
unprofitable to operate (Genesis Analytics 2005: 49-52). TEBA Bank (a bank established by the mining
industry to encourage savings and provide a service in migrant source areas) operates in Lesotho. While its
role could increase in the future, less than 1% of migrants surveyed use TEBA Bank as their main method
for transferring remittances. Slightly more (2%) pay remittances into spousal TEBA Bank accounts.

4.4 Use of Remittances
Interviews with remittance senders and receivers suggest that the latter make most of the decisions about
how remittances will be spent. When both are at home, decisions are taken jointly. Although there are
disagreements, very few respondents indicated that there is any serious conflict about the use of
remittances probably because such a small proportion is ever truly discretionary. Once school fees are
paid, health costs met, and clothing and groceries bought, there is never a lot left over. Conflict arises
when a spouse feels that the wage earner is wasting remittance money on non-essentials and/or is being
less than honest. One woman was extremely critical of her spouse for just these reasons suggesting, at the
very least, that there are normative expectations of remitters:
My husband is no use to our family at all and if things could be reversed it would be better if I went
to work instead of him and maybe there would be some change in our lives. My husband does not
send money and even when he brings it with him, he takes it to buy beer and entertain himself. He
fights for it if I refuse to give him the money. When he comes home he does not even want to take
a spade to dig the garden. He says he has come home to rest as he works hard in the mines. Him
working in South Africa brings only negative impacts and he is no use at all to the family.

19

Her spouse has been working for 20 years on the mines as a migrant. She has no idea how much he earns
(but it is probably in excess of R30,000 a year). She claims she only gets R3,000, all of which she spends
19

Interview No 33, 1 January 2009.
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on food and clothing, including for her niece and her husband’s mother. The family, she said, does not
have enough to eat many times during the course of the year. She is happy about compulsory deferred pay
because she would otherwise “never see a cent of it.” However, only her husband is able to withdraw the
funds in Lesotho, which he often does “without my knowledge and eats alone.”
Both remitters and recipients are in agreement that remittances are essential to the livelihood of household
members and that without them they would be “lost.” There are plenty of “lost” households in every
village to drive home the point. The perceived importance of remittances proved to be extremely high in
most areas (with the exception of access to public utilities such as clean water and electricity) (Table 4.8).
Since many households do not have access to either, this simply means that a remittance income does not
increase the chances of access. The perceived contribution of remittances to total household income shows
that most households (89%) find it important or very important. What stands out, however, is that
remittances are seen as key to having enough food in the household (with nearly 90% saying that it is
important or very important). Remittances, in other words, are seen as crucial to the very survival of the
household and its members.
Table 4.8: Perceived Importance of Remittances

In Having Enough to Eat
In Having Enough Clean Water
In Accessing Medical Treatment
In Having Electricity in Home
In Having Enough Cooking Fuel
In Having a Cash Income
N=1026
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Very
Important

Important

Neutral

Not
Important

Not
Important
at All

Don’t
Know

73.4
40.2
62.6
6.3
58.7
63.1

16.5
17.3
25.0
2.2
28.5
25.7

2.2
9.6
3.8
2.4
3.9
2.9

3.0
11.6
3.2
3.8
2.2
2.5

4.7
20.8
5.3
84.7
6.5
5.6

0.2
0.6
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.1

How do migrant-sending households in Lesotho actually spend their remittance income? First, it is useful
to look at household budgets. The relative importance of different types of expenditure may be seen by
looking at the percentage of households incurring an expense in the month prior to the survey (Table 4.9).
Food and groceries are by far the most important expenditure (by 93% of households), followed by fuel
(76%), clothes (73%), transportation (52%) and medical expenses (24%). Only 9% saved any funds, 7%
invested in farming and 5% spent on education. Over the course of a year, the proportion of households
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spending money on school fees would probably be much higher as all secondary school children in
Lesotho have to pay fees at the beginning of the school year.
The average household spent M490 on food and M678 on clothes in the month prior to the survey. Much
less was spent on the two other items on which the majority of households incurred expenditures: fuel
(M120) and transportation (M124). The households with medical expenses spent an average of M101.
The 5% of households that did spend on education incurred significant costs of M662. While only a small
proportion of households had funds to spend on building, special events and farming, the average amounts
spent were quite significant (M3,073, M2,176 and M642 respectively). Almost half (47%) of households
had no savings. Although less than 10% of households had saved any money in the previous month, those
that did saved an average of M740. The greatest monthly expenditure of all of these households combined
was on clothes (29%), followed by food and groceries (27%), special events (9.5%), building (6.4%), fuel
(5.4%), entertainment (4.2%) and transportation (2.4%).

Table 4.9: Monthly Household Expenses by Category

Food and groceries
Housing
Utilities
Clothes
Alcohol
Medical expenses
Transportation
Cigarettes, tobacco, snuff
Education
Entertainment
Savings
Fuel
Farming
Building
Special events
Gifts
Other expenses
Source: SAMP Household Survey

% of
Households
Incurring
Expense
92.5
0.9
16.7
72.7
12.0
24.2
52.3
10.5
5.4
1.6
8.7
76.3
7.1
3.5
7.3
3.6
1.2

Average
Amount
Spent (M)

Total
Amount
Spent (M)

%

490
150
117
673
209
101
124
84
663
125
740
120
642
3,073
2,176
119
1,060

462,560
1,350
20,007
499,366
25,707
24,947
71,556
8,968
36,465
72,000
65,860
93,480
46,224
110,628
163,220
4,403
12,720

26.9
0.0
1.2
29.0
1.5
1.5
2.4
0.5
2.0
4.2
3.8
5.4
2.7
6.4
9.5
0.3
0.7
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Table 4.10: Use of Remittances

Food
Clothing
School fees
Fares
Funeral and burial policies
Seed
Savings
Fertiliser
Funeral
Tractor
Fuel
Feast
Cement
Labour
Bricks
Insurance policies
Doors and windows
Roofing
Dipping and veterinary costs
Oxen for ploughing
Other special events
Paint
Repay loans
Cattle purchase
Wood
Marriage
Purchase stock for sale
Small stock purchase
Poultry purchase
Vehicle purchase/maintenance
Vehicle and transport costs
Walls
Other farm input
Equipment
Labour costs
Machinery and equipment
Personal investment
Source: SAMP Household Survey

% of Households
Using Remittances
89.3
76.1
56.0
50.0
28.7
24.4
18.7
18.5
16.3
12.5
9.9
7.1
5.2
5.1
4.5
4.5
3.8
3.6
2.6
2.5
2.2
2.0
1.9
1.4
1.3
1.1
1.1
1.1
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.0

The most common expenditure items for remittances are food (90% of households spent remittances on
food), clothing (76%), school fees (56%) and fares (transportation) (34%) (Table 4.10). In terms of
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agricultural inputs, a quarter of households spent remittances on seed, 18.5% on fertilizer, 12.5% on
tractors and 3.9% on livestock. However, most of these agriculture-related expenditures were for
subsistence food production. Nearly 19% of households put some remittance income into savings. Other
expenditures such as funerals (incurred by 16% of households) and funeral and burial insurance policies
(29%) reflect the impact of HIV/AIDS.

The importance of basic needs expenditure is further highlighted when the estimated percentage of
remittance money is examined for the most important expenditures (Table 4.11). For all major expense
items the proportion of the remittance contribution is 80% and higher.
Table 4.11. Proportion of Expenses Paid from Remittances
Food and groceries
Housing
Utilities
Clothes
Alcohol
Medical expenses
Transportation
Cigarettes, tobacco, snuff
Education
Entertainment
Savings
Fuel
Farming
Building
Special events
Gifts
Total contributions from remittances
Source: SAMP Household Survey

%
90.3
91.1
85.1
92.1
89.9
86.4
89.6
86.1
86.8
100.0
83.0
88.7
88.5
91.2
85.4
71.2
88.7

Further dramatic proof of the importance of remittances to household food security and other basic needs is
provided by a tabulation of the types of goods that migrants had sent home in the previous year. There is
little evidence of luxury goods being remitted. Instead, clothing (29% of households) and food (7.6%) are
clearly the items most frequently brought or sent. Migrant-sending households in Lesotho thus spend the
greater proportion of total income on basic necessities. In other words, consumption-spending (for
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necessities not luxuries) constitutes the pre-dominant usage of household income, a pattern observed in
many other parts of the developing world.

Table 4.12: Proportion of Households Receiving Remitted Goods
Type of Goods:

%

Clothing

28.6

Food

7.6

Consumption Goods

2.5

Fuel

0.7

Equipment

0.5

Seed

0.2

Poultry

0.2

Goods for Funeral

0.2

Goods for Feast

0.2

Roofing

0.1

To assume that only those households receiving remittances benefit from them would be a mistake. Within
villages, there are formal and informal local relationships of obligation, reciprocity and charity with kin
and neighbours by which remittances “spread” beyond the immediate beneficiary household. The
interviews revealed that while in most cases remittances are spent only on immediate household members,
remittances are passed on to other relatives, friends or poorer members of the community. One household
in Ha Mafefooane, for example, consists of six people.

20

The de facto household head is a young male of

22, a university student. He looks after his younger brother (aged 18) and two younger sisters (aged 13 and
4). His two older sisters are both migrants to South Africa. One (aged 25) had been working in a shop in
South Africa for 5 years. The other (aged 24) has just gone to South Africa for the first time. This
household had four members in school yet receives no remittances at all direct from the two female
migrant members in South Africa. Yet it still spent R4,000 on food, R1,700 on school fees and R1,500 on
clothes over the previous year. The key to the puzzle is their widowed father. After their mother died, he
moved in with a woman in another household. The two sisters send their remittances to their father “who
20

Interview No 25, 3 January 2009.
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decides how the money should be used.” The father splits the money between his new household and that
of his children.

4.6 Gender Comparisons in Remittance Flows
Do patterns of remittance sending and usage vary with gender? In the next two sections of the report,
comparisons are made between households sending male migrants and households sending female
migrants, in order to compare male and female remittance behaviour and to assess any differential impact
of remittances sent to male and female migrant-sending households. Household-level data is presented on:
•

differences in the remitting behavior of male and female migrants;

•

the importance of remittances to male and female migrant-sending households;

•

differences in household expenditures in male and female migrant-sending households;

•

whether male or female migrants send more in times of household crisis or need; and

•

the perceived importance of remittances to the household.

What is perhaps most striking is the enormous significance of migrant remittances to household
subsistence and basic material needs, regardless of migrant gender. The general importance of remittances
is evident in the straightforward proportion of migrant-sending households that receive money from their
migrant members (Table 4.13). At close to 90% in Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, this is an
extremely high figure in international comparative terms. Male migrants from Lesotho are slightly more
likely to remit than female migrants. Given that male migrant labour is mainly in the mining sector, where
remittances are compulsory and that female migrant labour is in more precarious sectors of the labour
market, it is surprising that this observed gender discrepancy in remittance behaviour is not higher.
Table 4.13: Proportion of Households Receiving Remittances
Male MigrantSending
Households (%)
Lesotho
94.9
Mozambique
79.6
Swaziland
88.8
Zimbabwe
89.5
Source: SAMP Household Survey
Country

Female MigrantSending Households
(%)
89.3
58.8
92.9
90.1
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The household survey showed that the amounts of money remitted by female migrants overall are still
significantly lower than those of male migrants (Table 4.14). Women’s employment and livelihood
strategies – for example as informal sector traders or domestic workers compared to waged mine labour –
mean lower earnings overall and less regular or reliable remuneration than their male counterparts. In
addition, female migrants who are daughters rather than spouses or heads of household may remit a lower
proportion of their earnings compared to male migrants, who are more likely to be heads of household and
primary breadwinners.
Table 4.14: Average Annual Remittances Received from Male and Female Migrants
Male Migrants
Mean
M11,162.46
Median
M9,600.00
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Female Migrants
M4,825.32
M3,600.00

While the gender differences in the monetary value of remittances are stark, Lesotho’s female migrants
remit significantly higher sums than their counterparts in Swaziland, Mozambique or Zimbabwe. This
could reflect differences in their relative earnings. Alternatively, it could be because the need for
remittance income is greater in Lesotho, with fewer alternative livelihood options available and migrantsending households being more directly dependent on migrant remittances. This is likely to be especially
true for the female-centred households which make up such a high proportion of Lesotho households
sending female migrants.
Gender differences diminish considerably when remittances are considered in terms of their contribution to
the household economy, rather than their absolute monetary value. Migrant remittances form an important,
and in many cases the only, source of income for many migrant-sending households in Lesotho (Table
4.15). Of all the countries surveyed, Lesotho had the highest incidence of households reporting remittance
earnings. Wage work, casual work and informal business were the only other significant sources of
household income in the Lesotho sample, all falling well below remittances. Migration is thus not merely a
supplementary livelihood strategy but the principal source of household income for over 90% of migrantsending households, both male and female-migrant sending.
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Table 4.15: Sources of Household Income in Male and Female Migrant-Sending Households
Source of Household
Male Migrant-Sending (%)
Income
Wage work
8.3
Casual work
5.0
Remittances – money
95.7
Remittances – goods
19.6
Farm product sales
2.4
Formal business
2.1
Informal business
6.5
Pension/ disability
0.2
Gifts
2.4
Other
0
Refused to answer
0
Don’t know
0.5
N
841
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Female Migrant-Sending (%)
15.0
12.1
90.0
22.8
2.8
1.4
6.4
2.1
1.4
0
0
2.1
140

Note: Because many households had more than one source of income, percentages add up to more than
100%.

Over 95% of the households with male migrant members listed remittances as a source of household
income. Fewer than 10% list income from the second-ranking income source, non-migrant wage labour.
The equivalent proportions for female-sending households are around 90% and 15%. Households sending
male migrants thus appear to be especially dependent on remittance earnings. This reflects both the higher
proportion of male migrants who are household heads, and the higher earnings of male migrants, which
make it more feasible to rely solely on remittances to meet basic household needs. Households sending
female migrants are more likely to have to supplement remittance earnings with other sources of income,
as female migrants remit lower sums. Female migrants are also less likely to be household heads, which
means that they are often members of households with other working adult members, especially in cases
where they come from extended families.

Taking these factors into consideration, it is again surprising that the gender discrepancies in remittance
dependence were not found to be greater. As the country with the highest proportion of male and female
migrants giving their status as head of household, making the migrants more likely to be their family’s
primary breadwinner, Lesotho’s gender differences in household income sources were lower than for any
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of the other countries surveyed, including even Zimbabwe. It should also be noted that the gender
differences in dependence on monetary remittances are slightly offset by female migrants’ higher levels of
remittance of goods.
In sum, female migrant remittances are a demonstrably important source of both income and material
goods for households sending female migrants. Whether they are household heads, spouses or daughters,
women migrants are clearly sending significant sums of money and quantities of goods back to their
families in Lesotho, contributing in no small way to those households’ material welfare. This is confirmed
by the more detailed exploration of the use and impact of remittances in the next section.
4.5 Gender Comparisons in Remittance Usage
Female migrants and recipients certainly feel that their priorities in using remittances differ from those of
men. As one Focus Group participant observed:
Men and women spend money differently. Women often spend money inside the home while men
on the other hand spend it outside the family. Men use the money to buy beer and other
entertaining items while women would rather buy something that will benefit the whole family,
such as buying food for the whole family. The man would take M100 of the money he brought
home and use it to entertain himself alone but when he gets home he would demand food. The
following day he takes another R100 and he would do that the whole holiday he is at home.

21

The household data on use of remittances provides statistically-representative insights into the similarities
and differences between male and female migrant-sending households in Lesotho. Household expenditure
in particular categories (Tables 4.16 and 4.17) shows only small differences between male and female
migrant-sending households, once again demonstrating the importance of both male and female migrants’
remittances to their recipient households.
Table 4.16: Proportion of Migrant-Sending Households Incurring Particular Expense
Expense Incurred in
Previous Month:
Food/Groceries
Housing
Utilities
21

Male Migrant-Sending (%)

Female Migrant-Sending (%)

93.3
0.7
17.7

90.0
1.4
12.1

Focus Group 2: Female Migrants.
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Clothes
Alcohol
Medical costs
Transport
Tobacco
Education
Entertainment
Savings
Fuel
Farming
Building
Special events
Gifts
Other
N
Source: SAMP Household Survey

73.7
13.0
26.5
54.8
10.9
5.7
1.7
10.1
77.9
7.7
3.9
7.7
3.9
0.8
841

68.6
5.7
12.9
39.3
8.6
3.6
0.7
2.1
69.3
4.3
0.7
5.7
2.1
1.4
140

Table 4.17: Migrant-Sending Household Expenditures22
Median Amount Spent in Previous Month (M)
Male MigrantFemale MigrantSending
Sending
Food/Groceries
400
215
Utilities
60
75
Clothes
500
350
Medical expenses
50
33
Transport
70
40
Education
230
230
Domestic fuel
90
50
Farming
350
100
Source: SAMP Household Survey
Category

The main household purchases for both male and female migrant-sending households are the basic
commodities of food, domestic fuel, and clothing, in addition to fundamental services such as transport and
health care (Table 4.16). In terms of the number of households reporting expenditure in a particular

4.17 shows the reported average amount of the previous month’s expenditure in various
categories, using median rather than mean values to provide a more accurate reflection of average
expenditure levels, as this reduces the influence of one or two respondent households with high
expenditure. Note too that the values in Table 43 are only for those households reporting the particular
expenditure (i.e. excluding the ‘zero-expenditure’ households in each category), and also represent
expenditure in a particular single month rather than averaged over a year.
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22 Table

category in the previous month, the most common expenditures are, in rank order, food, domestic fuel (e.g.
paraffin, wood, gas), clothing, and transport. Some gender differences emerge in the reported monetary
expenditure in various categories (Table 4.17). Expenditure was found to be higher in almost every
category for male compared to female migrant-sending households, and this was more consistently the case
for Lesotho than for any of the other countries in the survey. This suggests that in Lesotho in particular,
households with female migrant members (many of which, it should be recalled, were also female-headed)
are indeed poorer and forced to ‘go without’ more often than households where the migrant members are
men.
Given the weighting of overall household expenditures towards basic necessities, what is the role of
remittances in enabling migrant-sending households to purchase certain goods and services? Are
remittances spent on the same general basket of items? Or are they used for non-essential or luxury items,
or perhaps directed towards savings or investment in business or other productive activities? Table 44,
which ranks the categories of expenditure for remittance earnings specifically, shows both the ‘basic
needs’ nature of remittance expenditure and the identical ranking of expenditure categories for male and
female migrant-sending households. Food is the most common annual expenditure of remittance earnings
in both male- and female-migrant households (Table 4.18). Second is clothing, followed by school fees.
Transport fares rank fourth, with funeral policies the fifth-greatest expenditure of remittance income.
Table 4.18 Ranking of Most Important Uses of Cash Remittances Over
Previous Year
Male Migrant-Sending Households
Food
Clothes
Schooling
Fares
Funeral policies

Female Migrant-Sending Households
Food
Clothes
Schooling
Fares
Funeral policies

Remittance-receiving households confirmed the significance of remittances to food purchases (Table 4.19).
The most consistent importance rating, for both migrant genders, is food, with school fees and clothes also
rated highly by many. There are some gender differences, with men’s remittances seemingly more crucial
to the purchase of basic livelihood items, such as food, than women’s. Given that men are older, more
likely to be married, and more often the heads of households than female migrants, it is perhaps surprising
that this gender difference was not greater.
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Table 4.19: Importance of Remittances in Annual Household Expenditure
Category
Food
Clothes
Schooling
Fares
Seed
Savings
Funeral
policies
Funerals

Very important
Important
Very important
Important
Very important
Important
Very important
Important
Very important
Important
Very important
Important
Very important
Important
Very important
Important

N
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Male MigrantSending (%)
72.0
8.0
53.0
21.3
50.8
8.0
39.0
13.3
20.7
4.5
16.4
4.5
19.6
9.9
9.5
6.8
841

Female MigrantSending (%)
68.6
8.6
50.1
12.1
37.9
8.6
80.0
7.9
27.1
1.4
27.1
5.7
59.3
5.7
40.7
7.1
140

What stands out is the fundamental importance of remittances in enabling migrant-sending households to
meet their basic needs, such as food and clothing, and basic services such as transport and schooling.
Remittances are used to some extent to support agricultural production through seed purchases, but given
the low reported income from farm product sales this must be largely for household subsistence
production. Categories in which households sending female migrants expressed higher importance of
remittance income in meeting expenditure included transport, funerals and funeral policies, but otherwise
the broad rankings are similar for male and female migrant-sending households. Remittance earnings
certainly do not appear to be ‘squandered’ on luxury consumer items, but rather are used, either directly or
indirectly, to meet households’ subsistence needs. In general, the pattern for expenditure of remittances
reflects the patterns for overall household expenditure, and the households of both male and female
migrants stressed the importance of remittances in enabling them to meet those needs.
The ‘typical’ male or female migrant from Lesotho sends home money, which their households use to buy
food and other basic goods and services, and brings home clothing, food and consumer goods (Table 4.20).
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Consumer goods and ‘luxury’ items (e.g. electronic goods) are more readily available and also cheaper in
South Africa, so it is not surprising to find them included here, but food and clothing still ranked well
above consumer goods in stated importance. Again, there is a striking similarity between migrants of
different gender.
Table 4.20: Most Important Goods Remitted by Migrants
Male Migrant-Sending
Clothes
Food
Consumer goods

Female Migrant-Sending
Clothes
Food
Consumer goods

In addition to making regular remittances, migrants send money home in times of need, or to meet
unexpected costs. Funeral costs are by far the most common, along with funds for weddings and other
feasts. Lesotho, which had the highest overall dependence on migrant remittances among the countries
surveyed, reported the lowest incidence of such ‘once-off’ or emergency remittances, although the levels
were still considerable. Some gender differences are evident (Table 4.21), with a higher proportion of male
migrants reported as sending money in times of need. This may reflect their role as heads of household,
with primary responsibility for meeting such emergency needs.
Table 4.21: Proportion of Households Receiving Emergency Remittances
Male Migrant-Sending
(%)
Lesotho
44.0
Mozambique
59.3
Swaziland
51.9
Zimbabwe
54.8
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Female Migrant-Sending (%)
37.1
35.3
61.9
54.2

Emergency remittances are clearly important to the households receiving them. They are seen as important
or very important by 98% of migrant-sending households in Lesotho, with only very small differences on
the basis of migrant gender (Table 4.22).
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Table 4.22: Stated Importance of Emergency Remittances
Male MigrantSending (%)
Very important
73.9
Important
24.5
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Female MigrantSending (%)
70.6
27.5

Overall, in gender terms, it is the similarities in the expenditure of remittances from male and female
migrants that are so strong and revealing. Two important conclusions follow. First, for both male and
female migrants, migration is commonly undertaken in the role of primary breadwinner, rather than as a
supplement to other sources of household income. Second, remittances are more important as means of
securing basic household livelihoods, alleviating poverty, and meeting emergency costs than as drivers of
broader economic development.
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5.0 LINKS BETWEEN REMITTANCES AND DEVELOPMENT
5.1 Remittances and Poverty Reduction
Poverty continues to be the major driving force behind internal and cross-border migration in Lesotho.
For most households (except the most skilled) migration remains a household survival strategy rather than
a strategy for creating wealth and economic development opportunity. Several studies have mapped the
pervasive nature of poverty in Lesotho, its causes and geographical distribution (Sechaba Consultants
1991, 1994, 1995, 2000; World Bank 1995; May et al 2002; Omole 2003). Two longitudinal studies of
poverty in the 1990s showed that despite positive national economic growth (primarily from the Lesotho
Highlands Water Project and the textile industry), poverty remained a chronic problem in Lesotho. May et
al (2002) compared data from National Household Budget Surveys in 1986-7 and 1994-5 and drew the
following conclusion:
The data show that the incidence and severity of poverty is greater among a number of social
groups, female headed households, people living in rural areas, especially in the mountainous parts
of Lesotho, the elderly, children, those who rely upon agricultural production and agricultural assets
(May et al 2002).
The proportion of households below the poverty line was 58% at both points in time.

23

However, the

severity of poverty increased for both poor and ultra-poor households. Poor households tended to be
larger and with higher age dependency ratios. Other significant variables were the gender and employment
status of the household head. In 1986-7, 27% of poor households were headed by women who were single,
divorced, widowed or abandoned, a figure that rose to 30% in 1994-5. The proportion of female-headed
households that were poor was 65% in 1986-7 and 62% in 1994-5 – a slight decrease. However, maleheaded households in the poor category decreased from 65% to 58%. De facto female-headed households
(those with a male migrant spouse) experienced an increase in the incidence and depth of poverty (from
48% to 55%), a clear consequence of lay-offs in the South African mining industry.
Unemployment was a key determinant of household poverty: more than two-thirds of households with an
unemployed household head were below the poverty line at both points in time. Between 1986-7 and
1994-5 there was also a substantial increase in unemployment amongst heads of poor households (from
23

Poverty Line of M124 per person per month in 2001 prices (May et al 2002: 4).
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18% to 31%). The proportion of female-headed households falling below the poverty line increased from
70% to 78% during this time period. The other significant change was more positive: a fall in the
proportion of households with self-employed heads falling below the poverty line from 67% to 42%.
Marked changes also occurred in the major source of income for all households. In 1986-7 cash
remittances were the major source of income for 35% of households, a figure that had dropped to 23% in
1994-5. Amongst the poor, the fall was 31% to 23% and amongst the non-poor, even larger 40% to 24%.
The proportion of households reporting local wages as the main source of income increased from 17% to
27% overall, from 23% to 42% for the non-poor and from only 13% to 16% for the poor. In other words,
the relative importance of external versus internal wages as a source of household income shifted with
mine retrenchments. And very few poor households were able to make that shift. The main fallback for
poor households was agriculture (with 27% of households reporting it as the main source of income in
1986-7 and 42% in 1994-5).
Many of these trends are evident in another study that revisited 328 households in 2002, first interviewed
in 1993 (Wason and Hall 2004; Gill-Wason 2004). The authors conclude that Lesotho’s economic growth
in the 1990s did not significantly reduce poverty. The proportion of poor households had risen to 68% by
2002. In 1993, 68% of the sample had no bank account or nothing in it; this had risen to 82% by 2002.
Some 26% of the households were chronically poor (i.e. below the poverty line in 1993 and still there in
2002). Only 14% had risen above the poverty line while 28% had fallen below it (the “descending poor.”)
(Wason and Hall 2004: 23). A third of the descending poor households had experienced a change of head.
Being chronically poor was also positively correlated with having a female head. Access to wage work (in
Lesotho or in South Africa) was a critical determinant of whether households stayed above the poverty
line. Those above or moving above had much more significant and consistent access than those that
remained or fell below the poverty line. Some 34% of the households that had one or more wage workers
in 1993 had none in 2002. Of these, 49% had declined into poverty.
The most recent snapshot of contemporary household poverty was provided by a SAMP poverty and
migration survey of 1,224 households in all parts of Lesotho (Green 2006a). Of 3,197 household members
over 18, only 22% were working full-time. Another 17% were working part-time, leaving 61%
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unemployed. The study used the Afrobarometer Lived Poverty Index as a poverty measure. 24 The LPI
shows that only 41% of households always have cash income and 29% always have sufficient food. As
many as 23% said they never have enough food to eat (Green 2006a). Asked to compare household
economic circumstances with 12 months previously, 43% said they were worse and 11% much worse.
Comparing households with and without migrants, the study found that 39% of migrant households but
only 28% of non-migrant households satisfied their basic needs. As Green (2006a) concludes, “There is a
clear pattern from the data which suggests that households with migrant workers are more wealthy than
those without and this clearly suggests that migration is a strong anti-poverty indicator.” What is equally
clear is that even households with part or full-time wage earners still struggle to secure a livelihood.
Remittances are clearly essential to household subsistence and well-being. However, this still does not
give a sense of the nature and intensity of the poverty and deprivation experienced by migrants’
households. To ascertain the links between migrant gender and poverty, data was collected on ‘lived
poverty’. Households with migrant members were asked how often they had gone without particular basic
needs in the previous year (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Frequency of Household Deprivation of Basic Needs in
Previous Year

Never
Once or
twice
Several
times
Many times
Always
Never
Once or
twice
Several
24

Male Migrant-Sending
Female Migrant-Sending
(%)
(%)
Gone without: Food
48.3
32.9
15.3

15.7

15.2

18.6

19.6
1.5
Gone without: Clean water
34.4

32.1
0.7
39.3

14.0

10.0

17.8

17.9

The LPI is based on answers to questions about how often the people in the household have had
sufficient basic items in the previous year: food, water, medicine, cooking fuel and cash income. Answers
are collected in five categories: never, just once or twice, several times, many times, always.
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times
Many times
27.1
29.3
Always
6.7
3.6
Gone without: Medicine or medical treatment
Never
37.6
32.1
Once or
28.2
25.7
twice
Several
18.3
20.7
times
Many times
14.3
17.9
Always
1.7
3.6
Gone without: Electricity
Never
4.8
3.6
Once or
2.1
0.7
twice
Several
0.6
0.0
times
Many times
0.7
0.0
Always
91.8
95.7
Gone without: Fuel for cooking
Never
47.9
47.1
Once or
21.4
20.7
twice
Several
14.6
12.9
times
Many times
15.0
17.9
Always
1.1
1.4
Gone without: Cash income
Never
26.3
19.3
Once or
28.1
17.9
twice
Several
17.6
22.9
times
Many times
25.6
33.6
Always
2.4
5.7
Source: SAMP Household Survey
Female migrant-sending households in Lesotho are relatively more deprived than male migrant-sending
households. Slightly over half of female migrant-sending households reported going without food ‘several
times’ or more in the previous year, compared to only 36% of male migrant-sending households. A similar
pattern was found for deprivation from cash income: 62% for female migrant-sending households, 46% for
male migrant-sending households. Deprivation indices were more gender-equivalent for electricity, water
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and fuel, but this is more a reflection of a general lack of service provision, especially in rural areas, than
of poverty per se. Even for medicine and medical treatment, female migrant-sending households are worse
off than male migrant-sending households.
Lesotho’s female migrants (most of whom go to South Africa to work in domestic service) evidently come
from very poor, severely deprived households that would likely be considerably worse off if they did not
have migrant remittances as a source of income. That ‘lived poverty’ is so intensely and materially
experienced by household members of both male and female migrants reinforces the finding that migration
from Lesotho to South Africa is important as a household survival strategy. Comparisons with non-migrant
households would be necessary to ascertain whether households without any migrant members are
relatively better or worse off than those with migrant members, but given the stated importance of
remittances to meeting migrants’ households’ basic needs, migration is certainly the mainstay of those
households’ livelihoods.
In order to determine how the role and significance of migration are perceived by sending households,
respondents were asked to assess the overall impact of migration on a five-point scale from very positive to
very negative. They were also asked questions about the most positive and most negative aspects of
having household members working in another country. Respondents were broadly positive about the
overall impact of migration, although more so for male than for female migration (Table 5.2). Close to
70% of the male migrant-sending household respondents in Lesotho regard migration as having positive or
very positive impacts. The proportion for female migrant-sending households was lower, at 59%.
Table 5.2: Perceived Overall Impact of Migration on the
Household
Male Migrant-Sending
(%)
Very positive
34.4
Positive
35.2
Neither
2.3
Negative
13.9
Very negative
12.7
Don’t know
1.5
Total
100
N
841
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Female MigrantSending (%)
17.9
41.5
2.1
17.1
20.7
0.7
100
140
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A surprisingly large proportion of the female migrant-sending households from Lesotho regard the impact
of migration as either negative or very negative, at 38% as compared to 27% of the male migrant-sending
households. This is especially interesting given the high levels of poverty and deprivation in Lesotho’s
female migrant-sending households and the significant contribution made by female migrant remittances to
household income and expenditure. Possible explanations are that the social costs of migration are felt to
outweigh the economic gains; or alternatively that female migration is indeed a ‘last resort’, and thus a
source of shame and embarrassment to the household, especially if it is related to marital breakdown or to
perceived male failure to earn a living for the family. Female migration itself may be regarded by many in
Lesotho as socially inappropriate or undesirable, even if it is recognized as economically necessary.
Perceptions of the positive impacts of working in another country reinforce the findings from income,
expenditure and deprivation data, i.e. that migration primarily improves household living conditions (Table
5.3). Differences based on the gender of the migrant are small. This supports the finding that female
migration is as economically important as male migration, at least to the migrant-sending households
themselves.

Table 5.3: Most Positive Effects of Migration on the Household
Male MigrantSending (%)

Female MigrantSending (%)

16.2

24.7

6.9

5.6

Improved living conditions

63.2

58.6

Supports children’s education

11.7

11.1

Job opportunities
Migrant acquires skills
N
Source: SAMP Household Survey

<1
<1
841

0.0
0.0
140

None
Supports household

Most Basotho families are struggling simply to survive. Remittances are directed almost exclusively to the
basic needs of household members. The bulk of remittances are spent on necessities such as food,
clothing, school fees, medical supplies, cooking fuel and transportation. Very little is left over for
investment in agricultural production or small business development. Savings are almost non-existent.
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Yet, in some ways, the country’s migrant-sending households are actually the fortunate few. They are not
at the top of the economic ladder, but they are above the great majority at the bottom.
5.2 Remittances and Agriculture
Lesotho is still a predominantly rural society although urbanization is proceeding very rapidly. One
reason, among many, is declining agricultural production and productivity. Cereal production reached a
high of about 200 kg per person in the mid-1970s but is currently around the 50-60 kg level. The expected
figure for the 2007 season reached its lowest point ever at 40 kg per person. The FAO standard for
subsistence production of cereal crops is a minimum of 180 kg per person, so that at present Lesotho is
producing less than a quarter of expected needs. Food insecurity is a constant for many households. Every
year, large quantities of the primary staple, maize, are imported from South Africa (Forum for Food
Security 2004: 11; Mphale et al 2003). Given the serious lack of employment, the World Food Programme
declared a serious emergency, in 2007-8 with about 400,000 people facing severe food insecurity.
Much of the recent difficulty can be attributed to drought, with severe weather conditions prevailing over
much of Southern Africa in the 2004-2007 period. But loss of soil fertility is another factor, since
Lesotho’s arable land has been over-cultivated for many years. A further reason is a slow reduction over
the years in the number of fields which are cultivated. Boehm (2003) argues that the current disintegration
of the mine migrant labour system has reinforced the marginal position of farming in Lesotho. Households
without access to mine remittances no longer have the resources to invest in agriculture. Another factor of
increasing importance is the loss of able-bodied agricultural labour through HIV/AIDS. Turner (2004: 11)
acknowledges that many fields are still cultivated, but points out the difficulty: “Those affected households
that struggle on, often headed by old people or orphans, typically suffer poverty because they are no longer
able to farm as they did before, and/or because their capacity to generate off-farm income has dwindled or
disappeared.”
The household survey provided important insights into the relationship between agriculture and
remittances (Table 5.4). Around a quarter of households bought seed and one in five bought fertilizer.
Around 15 percent used remittances to assist with ploughing. Five percent used remittances to employ
people in their field but less than 2% used remittances to purchase cattle. In other words, almost threequarters of households do not spend any of their remittances on agriculture-related activity. The survey
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also showed that less than 3% of households receive income from the sale of farm products. In other
words, even when remittances are invested in agriculture this is largely to try to increase the food
production of the household.

Table 5.4: Use of Remittances for Agriculture
%
24.4
18.5
12.5
2.5
5.1
1.4
1.1
0.8
2.6
0.6
0.3
0.4

Seed
Fertiliser
Tractor Hire
Oxen for ploughing
Labour
Cattle purchase
Small stock purchase
Poultry purchase
Dipping and veterinary costs
Vehicle and transport costs
Equipment
Other farm input
Source: SAMP Household Survey

The experience of one ex-migrant farmer, a man of 70, clearly illustrates the constraints that households
face.
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Many households have no land which means they are unable to farm at all. This particular man

does have fields. His daughter and son are both migrants but he finds the former a far more reliable
remitter perhaps, he says, because he is looking after her 13-year old son. However, she only remits R800
a year. He uses the money to hire casual workers from the village to help him plough and plant. He grows
maize (corn) and wheat and sells his surplus produce and earns about R1,600 a year. However, most of
this is spent on purchasing food and groceries so that he and his grand-daughter and another young man
who lives with him can have a more varied diet.
His main challenges as a farmer are (a) “the weather conditions, the worst enemy being the droughts and
hail, the other one is the attack of the plants by pests” and (b) lack of government support. He would like
help with a threshing machine, a place to store grain and a place to buy seeds and insecticides. He has
considered cash-cropping of vegetables, “but the problem is theft.” Another respondent said he receives
the R3,000 remitted by his working spouse in a similar manner, although, he only grows sorghum which he
25

Interview No 45, 8 January 2009.
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either sells “as is” or turns into malt which he sells to beer-brewers in the area. His income from the sale
of produce was R3,500 the previous year. What is interesting about these two cases is that they are both
older men who view themselves as farmers and say they have been farming since their youth. Few of
today’s young men and women would describe themselves that way.
5.3 Potential for Productive Use of Remittances
The proportion of migrant-sending households investing remittances in farming for sale and in formal
business and informal business is extremely low in Lesotho. There is also no statistically significant
difference between male and female migrant-sending households. This is an important point as households
with male migrants receive more in remittances than households with female migrants. Yet, the
overwhelming majority of households in both categories (over 90%) do not receive income from the sale of
farm produce or from formal or informal business. And even the very small minority who do make extra
income from these sources do not make large sums (an average of R6,708 p.a. in formal business, R3,066
p.a. in the informal sector and only R1,526 p.a. from the sale of farm produce).

Table 5.5: Sources of Household Income in Male and Female Migrant-Sending Households
Source of Household
Male MigrantIncome:
Sending (%)
Farm product sales
2.4
Formal business
2.1
Informal business
6.5
N
841
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Female MigrantSending (%)
2.8
1.4
6.4
140

Average Income (M)
1,525.93
6,708.00
3,066.41

Remittances to Lesotho are largely a zero-sum game at present. The money comes in from South Africa
and is spent mostly on South African or other foreign imports, especially foodstuffs and clothing. Efforts
to create small businesses through sharing of resources have not been successful over the years. CARE
attempted in the 1980s and 1990s to create mohair-spinning and seed-multiplication projects. They
depended on foreign subsidies to keep going, and in the end only one made even a marginal impact on the
economy of the village where it was located. IFAD developed credit associations in roughly the same time
period, but they never succeeded. The Ministry of Agriculture’s credit union was useful only to provide
seed to farmers, but it always lost money, mostly because of bad loans.
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The in-depth interviews identified a few respondents who did use remittances for some form of
entrepreneurial activity. Their experience is certainly of relevance since it (a) helps explain why so few
households in Lesotho invest remittances in entrepreneurial activity; (b) identifies the obstacles which
entrepreneurial individuals face and (c) permits recommendations on how the proportion of entrepreneurs
might be expanded.

Tefo Khetang is a young skilled manual worker in the construction industry in Johannesburg where he has
worked for a building contractor for two years.
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He is an irregular migrant and earns R22,000 a year. He

remits around R5,000 a year in cash and R7,000 worth of goods to his large household:
I am the main provider in the household of twelve people. All these people need food and clothing.
The money I send meets only two basic needs i.e. food and soap. There are complaints about the
amount of money I send because they are a large family. I normally send the money to my two
older brothers who are in charge. We have one married sister working in South Africa as well. I
send the money home through the bank. Owing to the size of the household, the money is just
enough to buy food but little as it is, it makes some difference because without it, life would be
difficult. When anybody falls ill at home, they just phone me and I send the money as they require.
The sheer size of the household places an extraordinary burden on Khetang. However, he believes that
there are “business opportunities for citizens of Lesotho (in South Africa) but the problem is getting proper
documentation and raising enough funds.” His aim is certainly “to open a business thus helping my family
and community.” He has begun in a small way and made R800 in December: “When I am here at this time
of year, I sell beer, soft drinks and some cigarettes. The business is doing well particularly at this time of
year. When I go back to South Africa, I think it will die a natural death unless my other brothers who are
still here give it a serious thought.”
Several female entrepreneurs had realized Khetang’s ‘dream’ of opening small shops though not without
considerable obstacles. All are married to current or ex-miners and have successfully used mine
remittances in their small business ventures. Perhaps the most successful respondent is Katleho Tsebo.
She is in her mid-40s and lives with her teenage daughter and 24 year old son. Her spouse has been
26
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Interview No 41, 24 December 2008.
Interview No. 50, 30 December 2008.
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working on the mines for 18 years and currently remits around R36,000 p.a. She started a grocery shop
with remittances but did not generate much profit. In 2008, Tsebo switched to selling alcohol which she
buys from a liquor store in another village. She hires someone to run the store and made a profit of
R92,400 in 2008. Of this she saves R24,000 p.a. at a bank as a retirement fund for her and her husband.
Her plans for further expansion are hampered only by her inability to get a substantial loan. Another
successful entrepreneur is 25 year old Masa Mponeng.
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She supports her elderly mother and four

children. When her husband was retrenched from the mines, she started a small spaza shop brewing and
selling traditional beer and buying and selling small items such as matches and candles. Her husband got
another job in South Africa and continues to remit about R10,000 p.a. She travels to the capital Maseru to
buy goods for her shop where she also sells vegetables she has grown at home. She makes about R3,000 a
year from the shop and another R1,500 from beer sales. Her transport costs to and from Maseru are
exorbitant (R2,500 a year). In the villages, there is also increasing competition from Chinese store-owners
(See Case Study 7).

Individual entrepreneurial opportunities in the rural villages are not particularly abundant. Though not
everyone can run or afford to run a spaza or a sheebeen, many of these outlets throughout the country were
started (and are sometimes sustained) by remittances. However, the start-up and running costs (even with
low overheads) are such that these are run primarily by the spouses of migrant mineworkers, who are
amongst the best paid migrants.
Focus Group participants spoke of current and ex-mineworkers who have also successfully entered the taxi
business. One man in the village had started by running a shop and then bought a minibus taxi with the
proceeds: “Now he has many.”
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Another man got together with his friends from another village and

started a taxi business. He first purchased a second hand taxi and then worked “very hard” until he was
able to buy another. He now owns five and hires drivers and conductors. Public transport is poor in
Lesotho and many people travel by minibus taxi within the country and when they go to South Africa. The
routes are highly competitive and it is (sometimes literally) a cut-throat business. The capital outlay is
considerable, however, and well beyond the means of most migrant workers, especially women.
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Interview No. 51, 8 January 2009.
Focus Group 2
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Case Study 7: Minding the Store
Most villages in Lesotho have one or two small shops known as spazas. These spazas sell common
household items, including groceries, which the owners tend to purchase in the towns and bring back to the
villages to sell. Spazas are often attached to the owner’s house and are run by the owner. Occasionally
they hire someone to look after the shop. Spazas perform an important function in many villages. They
are not generally as lucrative as shebeens (bars or taverns) but are a useful source of supplementary income
and savings for enterprising women. Many of these women are the spouses of miners and used remittances
from their spouse as start-up capital.
One such woman is 48 year old Palesa Tumelo. Her spouse has worked for many years on the mines and
although she does not know how much he earns, she receives around R17,000 p.a. in remittances (which is
more than many migrant women from Lesotho earn in a whole year). Remittances are spent on food,
transport, fuel, her mother-in-law’s monthly hospital visits and paying school fees for her brother-in-law’s
three children who live in a different household. Remittances are also used to cover the household’s
farming activities including purchase of seed and fertilizer and paying for casual labour to help with
ploughing, planting and harvesting. The household grows food primarily for own consumption. Without
remittances, she says, “these activities (food, education, housing, farming and health) would not be
possible. We would surely struggle to make ends meet.”
Unlike so many others who simply rely on the monthly remittance payment, Tumelo has tried to use the
funds to generate further income. She and her husband agreed that they start a business using remittance
money. She chose to open a shop because “it is the only kind of business I can operate myself” although
she sometimes hires someone to help out.
I am responsible for manning the shop, being a shop clerk. I draw lists of stocks that need
replenishing and go to Maseru (the capital city) myself to buy the stocks . I also do the pricing of
items and the cleaning of the premises. The business is now successful as it is self-sustaining and
no longer depends on outside sources of money to survive. The worst problem I experienced was
that I gave things to fellow villagers on credit and they delayed paying me, while some even failed
paying at all. My business collapsed and my husband came to the rescue and injected remittance
money. Now I no longer give credit.
She and her husband also purchased several minibus taxis with his remittance money. However, this
business was not very successful with her husband away and now they are left with only one taxi, which
they pay someone to operate.
Tumelo makes around R24,000 profit p.a. from her shop but the competition is closing in and it is nonBasotho. She is particularly angry about the advent of foreign business owners, especially the Chinese,
who she says are renting shops even at the village level and undercutting her prices. As a result, she says,
“no-one goes to Basotho-owned shops” any longer.
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In the villages in Lesotho, burial societies and grocery associations effectively “pool” a portion of
remittance receipts though not primarily for entrepreneurial reasons. Two Focus Group respondents
described how these operate:
There are burial societies within the community and members have to pay monthly contributions
towards the time when one of the members has a death in the family and the society has to pay what
is due to them. There are also grocery associations whereby monthly payments are also made by
members towards purchasing of Christmas groceries and food. The money is also available for
borrowing by members, to be paid back with interest. The main problem is non-payment of
borrowed money and interest. There are separate male and female associations within the
community. The women have the grocery associations.
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There are associations within the community. There are burial societies and an egg producer
association known as Egg Circle, where members are given the privilege of having their eggs sold
before everyone else. Burial societies differ but members commonly pay a monthly subscription
of an agreed amount and when they have a death in the family the society gives them their agreed
dues, whether money, a coffin or a cow. Problems occur when people do not pay their subscription
for a long time in which case they would receive nothing if they had a death, unless they pay what
they owe. The other problem is that more people are dying from AIDS these days and that puts
strain on the coffers of the societies as sometimes the societies would have as many as three deaths
in a week or month whereas before they would sometimes spend as long as six months without a
31
death.
Respondents in Ha Mafooane said there were a lot of “women’s organizations” in the area including food
and grocery associations. As well as loaning out money to be paid back with interest at the end of the year,
the associations buy food and groceries in bulk which they divide among themselves. There is also a
men’s-only association but the women were “leaving them in the dust” as their associations are growing
“in leaps and bounds.”
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The household survey showed that 12% of households borrowed money from informal money lenders in
the previous year. Some of the money lenders are actually migrants who use their earnings (in South
Africa) and remittances (in Lesotho) to loan money to needy persons or households. This is a double-
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edged sword. While it is a useful way for the benefits of remittances to be spread more broadly, most
households only borrow to meet emergencies. Informal money lenders are known as bo-machonisa (loan
sharks) in Lesotho and charge their clients “inhumane” interest.
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They commonly take people’s passports

as surety for loans and charge interest rates of 30-50%. One mineworker interviewed for this study, for
example, joined with a group of friends and they all pay R2,000 into a common pool at the beginning of
each year. They then make loans to those who need emergency funds and charge interest of 50%. At the
end of the year, they receive their original investment back plus their share of the profits. According to the
migrant, this helps him to cover the extra costs of the ‘festive season.’ Such enterprising activity is
viewed with distaste by poorer households or those who are forced for lack of alternatives to avail
themselves of the moneylending ‘service.’ This form of ‘entrepreneurship’ may be a profitable use of
remittances but it clearly undermines social capital and deepens the poverty of other households.

The household surveys show that despite their poverty, 27% of migrant-sending households owned
cellphones purchased with remittances. Although primarily communication devices (including with absent
migrant members of the household), a recent small-scale pilot project by the Regional Hunger and
Vulnerability Project (RHVP) in Lesotho suggests that the potential may be there for broader impacts.
RHVP distributed ten phones pre-loaded with US$50 of airtime (RHVP 2009). The idea was to “see how
vulnerable people benefit from cellphones, to disprove arguments against the use of cellphones for cash
transfers, and to prove that illiterate people are able to embrace technology.” Amongst the uses to which
the phones were put was to generate income by selling airtime so that the enterprise would become selfsustaining.
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They then used the money to purchase more phones. It is not clear whether the participants

were from migrant-sending households but the fact that over a quarter of the households surveyed already
own phones suggest that there is potential for the technology to impact positively as an income-generating
tool and, in time, to facilitate remittance transfer.
5.4 Obstacles to Entrepreneurship
The main obstacle that confronts many migrants and remittance-receiving households is the small size of
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Focus Group 2
In Kenya’s M-PESA scheme cellphones are used to send money. The service registered 111,000 users
within the first three months and transferred US$6 million.
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the remittance package and the fact that most of it is consumed on basic needs. Most households find that
by the time the remittance package has been spent on household needs (food, clothing, transport, fuel,
school fees and hospital visits), there is very little left over for productive income-generating investment.
Those who share remittances with other households have even less to spare. There is a clear gender
dimension to this issue. As noted above, men (mainly migrant miners) can earn three or four times as
much as women (mainly domestic and farm workers) and can remit more than women. Women’s earnings
and remittances are paltry and the researchers were able to find only one household where women’s
remittances were used (in this case by their father) to generate additional income through farming.
However, the household was small and the expenditures on basic needs lower so there was a small surplus.
Focus Group respondents were keen to explain how difficult it is in Lesotho to use remittances to establish
a business. As one man noted:
It is not easy to establish some business. Let me explain it this way. I may send money home but it
happens that it is not enough for a business because, first, when I left, I might already have had
some debts....There is also too much sharing of money before it reaches the destination. It is TEBA
this side, debts on the other and clothing for the children there, so it cannot be used for business.
There is no migrant who has managed to establish a business here.
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The female migrants concurred: “Money that we send home is not used for farming nor for business.” The
money is “all used for family needs and there is always none left to start a business.”

36

The fact that so few

households in the national survey invest in business activity certainly bears this out.
One woman stated quite categorically that “remittances are not used for business purposes, whether big or
small. Money is often sent to cover certain needs. The money that is sent is little and after all is done,
nothing remains to start a business.”
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In many cases, migrants remit whatever they can and there is little

or any surplus at the end of the month to save, invest, or to establish a small enterprise. However, the
proportion of the wage package that is remitted does vary considerably even amongst migrants making the
same amount of money.
Part of this is because of the variable costs that migrants encounter in South Africa. Migrant miners and
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most domestic workers usually get free board and lodging while at work. Others have to pay rent and for
their own food. If the migrant is in another relationship or has a second household in South Africa, the
remittance flow to Lesotho will be reduced accordingly. However, it is still likely that there is an element
of discretion in voluntary remitting. In other words, it is possible that the amount remitted is actually
determined by the livelihood needs of the household and that any surplus remains in South Africa and is
spent there. Why, in other words, send more when there are so few opportunities for business development
in Lesotho?
The second major obstacle is the lack of capital and loan financing for those who wish to develop a
business. Some respondents blamed the government for not assisting more:
You come with the little you worked for with difficulty but you will be required to pay for so many
things that what you had will get finished even before you start. When you establish a business
your intention is to live and help other Basotho do so but our government does not help. There is a
boulder blocking and we are not aware of it.”
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Others complained about the lack of loan facilities: “Our banks which have our money cannot give us
39

loans.”

Even micro-finance is difficult to obtain in Lesotho. During the research, the authors interviewed

the CEO of an NGO micro-finance company which has been very successful in providing micro-finance in
Zambia and has now entered the Lesotho market. The company only makes loans to civil servants and
employees where wages can be garnished if repayment is not made. This effectively precludes the
majority of poor migrant-sending households.
Most migrant-sending households are forced to borrow money during the course of the year, either because
the remittance flow is insufficient or irregular (Table 5.6). The majority (46%) borrow from family and
friends, presumably largely interest-free. Very few borrow to finance an entrepreneurial activity. Less
than 1% had borrowed money from banks or formal money lenders. Less than 5% had obtained loans from
micro-finance organizations. Apart from family and friends, the most common way of obtaining a loan
was from informal money lenders (12% of households).
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Table 5.6: Sources of Borrowed Funds
%
28.0
0.5
5.9
18.3
0.2
0.4
3.4
2.9
0.5
12.1
4.3
0.1

Friends
Employer
Burial society
Family
Church
Bank
Savings group
Union
Money lenders (formal)
Money lenders (informal)
Micro-finance Organisations
Other source
Source: SAMP Household Survey

Third, the net worth of remittance transfers is reduced in several ways. As noted, there are the transaction
costs of money transfer. Very few migrants use formal money transfer channels so this is not as big an
issue as it is in other countries. However, transaction costs are not absent even for informal channels. Net
income, and therefore remitting potential, is also reduced by the fact that some migrants are double-taxed
(in South Africa and again in Lesotho). Then there is the major problem of corruption. Some miners were
particularly critical of their recruiting agency, TEBA, and its Lesotho operations:
We normally send money home through TEBA but the problem is our spouses have to stand in long
queues and sometimes end up not receiving the money. There is much corruption at TEBA. Our
spouses are forced to pay bribes to get the service. It is painful that you remit M1,000 and M20 is
deducted for a bribe. The money now is already short to cover all that was supposed to be covered.
TEBA does not care for us mineworkers.
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No doubt this kind of corruption by TEBA employees is not condoned by management but they could do
more to root it out. Also problematic for migrants is widespread corruption at the border. Sechaba
Consultants (2002) argue that border posts between South Africa exist not to control the flow of people but
to allow the personal enrichment of border officials. Again, this “business of the border” is not condoned
by either government but they do seem powerless to prevent it. One of the major forms of corruption that
emerged in this study was the practice of permit renewal forced on migrants by the fact that entry to South
40
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Africa is limited to 30 days. Migrants who have overstayed in South Africa have to pay bribes to border
officials on return or, alternatively, pay for their passports to be taken to the border for stamping, when
more money flows into official pockets.
Fourth, the surveys discussed in this report indicate that remitting from South Africa takes the following
‘form’: a migrant from a household goes to South Africa, works and remits small amounts at regular
intervals to the individual household who spend the funds on basic needs such as food, clothing, education,
health and transport. There is no evidence of what has been called in other contexts “collective remitting”;
that is, groups of migrants pooling remittances and remitting to support a broader community development
initiative. But migrants do form mutual help associations in South Africa (such as stokvels and burial
societies) and in Lesotho itself there are mutual help associations in virtually every village and community
(burial societies, grocery associations and egg circles). Further research is needed on the operation,
organization and impact of these associations. They are quintessentially grassroots organizations amongst
migrant-sending households and help to build social capital in migrant communities. Their potential as
development agents has barely been examined but it seems that they do have considerable potential, if
supported in the right way, to add development value to the efforts of individual migrants at the level of the
community as a whole. A systematic research study on the relationship between migration and mutual selfhelp groups and associations in migrant communities is strongly recommended including how they operate
and are organized, what benefits they provide to participants and communities and, even more important,
what their potential is for improving the development benefits of migration through collective organization
and action.

A fifth obstacle to improving the development impacts of migration and remittances is inherent to the
regulatory framework governing movement between Lesotho and South Africa. Only miners and some
skilled migrants can get residence and work permits in South Africa. Everyone else has to go on 30 day
visitor’s permits. The moment they work in South Africa they are doing so irregularly. This makes
migrants vulnerable to exploitation by employers, compromises their basic rights and means that they
cannot do simple things like open a bank account in South Africa. Lesotho places no restrictions on the
migration of its citizens to South Africa for work. The government’s only concern is that people do not
move permanently to South Africa or cut their ties with home (Coplan 2000). This concern is founded on
the fear that scarce skills will be lost and remittance flows will decline.
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Finally, a major obstacle to realizing the development potential of remittances in Lesotho lies in what de
Haas et al (2009: 1) call “structural development constraints”:
A critical reading of the empirical literature leads to the conclusion that it would be naïve to think
that despite their often considerable benefits for individuals and communities, migration and
remittances alone can remove more structural development constraints. Despite their development
potential, migrants and remittances can neither be blamed for a lack of development nor be
expected to trigger take-off development in generally unattractive investment environments. By
increasing selectivity and suffering among migrants, current immigration restrictions have a
negative impact on migrants’ wellbeing as well as the poverty and inequality.
There can be few peaceful developing countries where the “investment environment” is more unattractive than
in Lesotho. In other words, bluntly put, even if receiving households had remittances to invest in
entrepreneurial and other income-generating activities, what could they possibly invest in? T his raises a key

issue which requires further exploration. How feasible is it for migrant workers from Lesotho to engage in
entrepreneurial activities in South Africa where the opportunities are much greater than in Lesotho? Can
loans and micro-credit be obtained more easily in South Africa? These questions suggest, at least, that it is
important to stop seeing Lesotho as the only site for entrepreneurship by migrants from Lesotho. South
Africa should also be seen as a potential site and market for the migrant entrepreneur and his or her
dependents. Certainly this is very true for cross-border traders who buy and sell in South African towns. It
should also be true for other forms of business enterprise. This would require a change in public policy in
South Africa.
5.5 Public Policies
Gay (2000: 25) calls for a ‘new immigration compact’ between South Africa and Lesotho and notes that:
“If Lesotho and South Africa were truly distinct and separate, it would be natural to speak of migration or
immigration” from one to the other. There is little doubt that South Africa would never have developed
into a modern industrial state without cheap migrant labour from neighbouring countries such as Lesotho.
If Lesotho were ever to claim reparations for the value of labour expended and lives lost and families
wrecked by the South African mines, the claim would probably bankrupt the South African fiscus. We
make this point only to indicate that the development of South Africa and Lesotho are inextricably linked,
and always have been.
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Lesotho is an impoverished, dependent and economically vulnerable state because of South Africa.
Basotho migrants cannot be kept out of South Africa and they will come in ever greater numbers if the
only employment and other economic opportunities are in South Africa itself. That much is certain. But
why should South African employees be permitted to take advantage of their poverty and vulnerable status
by paying them sub-minimum wages, abusing their basic labour and human rights and using them to
41

undercut unions and undermine labour standards? Lesotho ratified the ICMW in the hope that South
Africa would do likewise and begin to offer its migrants basic rights and protections, not a continuation of
the situation under apartheid. So far, the South African government (like receiving states around the
world) has studiously ignored the Convention.

Migration needs to be re-conceptualized in public policy discourse not as a threat to the interests of South
Africans but as something that is (and could be even more) mutually beneficial to both countries. The only
realistic way for this to happen is to open the border to free travel in both directions. This would involve
allowing Basotho to own land and seek jobs in South Africa without losing their citizenship. Lesotho’s
government would continue to be responsible for social services within its own borders, but Basotho would
have the chance to improve their material conditions within South Africa and to remit in much greater
volumes to their dependents who remain at home (Gay 2000: 45). Lest this be dismissed as an idealistic
pipedream, it is worth asking what has happened since Gay made his call for a new immigration compact.
First, the SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement has been formally adopted at the Summit of the
Heads of States and been signed by nine member states which now allows for the drafting of an
implementation plan (Williams et al 2006). However, for the Protocol to come into effect, at least nine
member states must have signed and ratified it. The ultimate objective of the protocol is “to develop
policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the movement of persons of the Region
generally into and within the territories of State Parties” by facilitating three types of movement:
•

Entry, for a lawful purpose and without a visa, into the territory of another State for a maximum period
of ninety (90) days per year for bona fide visits and in accordance with the laws of the State concerned.
The person must enter through an official border post, possess valid travel documents and produce
evidence of sufficient means of support for the duration of the visit. The Protocol is silent on what a

41 The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.
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migrant may or may not do during these three months.
•

Movement for Residence defined as “permission or authority, to live in the territory of a State Party in
accordance with the legislative and administrative provisions of that State Party." The Protocol also
encourages member states to facilitate the issuing of residence permits.

•

Movement known as Establishment defined as "permission or authority granted by a State Party in
terms of its national laws, to a citizen of another State Party, for: (a) exercise of economic activity and
profession either as an employee or a self-employed person; and (b) establishing and managing a
profession, trade, business or calling.

The Protocol makes it clear that entry for all three reasons will be governed by the national legislation of
the SADC member state which they are entering.
Second, in 2001, the Departments of Home Affairs in both South Africa and Lesotho asked SAMP to
conduct research on cross-border movement between the two countries and to make recommendations on
how to facilitate movement between them. This resulted in an extensive report which questioned whether
the considerable resources to manage border operations were being effectively utilized and recommended
the downgrading of the current border regime (Sechaba Consultants, 2002). A Joint Bilateral Commission
for Co-operation (JBCC) between the two countries was signed in 2001. The JBCC is used as a vehicle to
drive forward areas of co-operation between the two countries and by mid-2007, 20 subsidiary cooperation
agreements had been signed.
Since Lesotho and South Africa have both ratified the Protocol, they clearly have no fundamental
objections. There is therefore every reason for them to move forward bilaterally to implement all three
phases with immediate effect. In 2002, a bilateral Agreement on the Facilitation of Cross Border
Movement of Citizens between South Africa and Lesotho was drafted. The Agreement was independently
approved by the Cabinets of both countries in 2005-6 and finally signed in June 2007. This agreement
calls primarily for an easing of border controls between the two countries. This is a start but it does not go
nearly far enough and in late 2008 had still not been implemented. The aim of both states should be a
broader agreement which is consistent with the SADC Protocol and which includes not only Entry but also
Residence and, especially, Establishment. For co-development to be truly effective in the migration field
this “new immigration pact” is as urgently needed as ever.
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5.6 Recommendations and Good Practices
The research for this report has shown, at the national and household level, that migration from Lesotho is
deeply and profoundly gendered. Feminization of migration is proceeding rapidly but this does not mean
that a homogenous de-gendered “migrant” is emerging. There are major and entrenched differences
between male and female migrants in terms of their socio-demographic profile, their occupations and
opportunities in South Africa and their remitting behavior. Similarly, within Lesotho itself, there are
significant differences between male-sending and female-sending households. The latter are worse off
than the former and have even fewer opportunities for income-generating activity outside of migration.
Our first recommendation is that the gendered nature of migration and its differential impact on men and
women needs to be recognized and factored into all debates and policies for mainstreaming migration in
development in Lesotho.
The migration and development debate has tended to be hampered by the fact that the main “players” are
seen to be nation-states between which migrants move or circulate. This is particularly problematic in the
case of South Africa and Lesotho because it foregrounds the role of regulatory frameworks and control
policies in relation to migration between the two countries. As this report has argued, however, it is
precisely this kind of thinking that has seriously hampered two states that are inextricably bound together
in every way from moving forward to a ‘new immigration compact’ of free movement, unrestricted
economic opportunity and heightened remittance flow. There are promising signs that the reality of codevelopment is being recognized but that much more needs to be done to ensure that the migration and
remittance regime becomes truly co-developmental.
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